UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOME I L E D

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	FEB 1 0 1992
Plaintiff,) Richard M. Lawrence, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT
vs.))
DON I. NELSON, et al.,)
Defendants.)) CASE NO. 89-C-775-E
ORD	<u>E R</u>
Upon the motion of the plainti	ff, United States of America, to which
there is no objection, it is hereby ORDER	
Denni Enterprises, Inc., be dismissed without	
own costs and attorneys' fees.	
Dated this 10^{-4} day of 10^{-4}	<u>,</u> 1992.
	B), JANES O C. LON
SUBMITTED BY:	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
TONY M. GRAHAM United States Attorney PETER BERNHARDT, OBA #741	
Assistant United States Attorney	

3900 U.S. Courthouse Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103

(918) 581-7463

FILED

FEB 1 0 1992

GEORGE HOLTER,

Plaintiff,

Richard M. Lawrence, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT

vs.

No. 91-C-0087-E

WILLIAM HAROLD TYDINGS, GEORGE FLETCHER, RICHARD D. HICKS,

Defendants.

ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSING ORDER

IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk administratively terminate this action in his records, without prejudice to the rights of the parties to reopen the proceedings for good cause shown for the entry of any stipulation, order, judgment, or for any other purpose required to obtain a final determination of the litigation. The Court retains complete jurisdiction to vacate this order and to reopen the action upon cause shown within 20 days that settlement has not been completed and further litigation is necessary.

ORDERED this 10th day of February 1992.

CHIEF UUDGE JAMES O. ELLISON UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

~>¢

Petitioner,

vs.

No. 91-C-336-E

RICHARD HUDLEY, Superintendent of Tulsa Community Treatment Center, and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA,

Defendants.

Defendants.

ORDER

Richard M. Lawrence, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT

The Court has for consideration the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate filed on September 27, 1991. After careful consideration of the record and the issues, including the briefs and memoranda subsequently filed herein by the parties, the Court has concluded that the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate should be and hereby are adopted by the Court.

Principles of federalism and the doctrine of abstention, so important in our republican form of government, will not allow a Federal Court to upset a state conviction based on state law. The Oklahoma Courts are alone responsible for applying and interpreting state precedent as long as no rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution are violated. Fourth Amendment claims are the exception to the above rule. According to Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 493 (1976), "where a state has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the

ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure was introduced at his trial."

In addition, the Equal Protection claim asserted by Petitioner is inapplicable here. Wiggin v. State is distinguishable -- as shown by the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation. But even if it were not as obviously distinguishable as it is, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has the power to apply its own precedent or, directly or indirectly, overrule it.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner's request for oral argument be denied.

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be denied too. ORDERED this 7th day of February, 1992.

CHIEF JUDGE JAMES O. ELLISON UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

JEAN SCHAFFNER,	FILED
JEAN SCHAFFNER,	FEB 1 0 1992
Plaintiff,)
vs.	Richard M. Lawrence, Glerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT
LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, M.D.,) }
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,	į (
))
Defendant.) CASE NO. 91-C-384-E

ORDER

Upon the motion of the defendant, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, to which there is no objection, it is hereby ORDERED that this case be remanded to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for an award of disability benefits to the plaintiff, from February 4, 1988, plaintiff's alleged onset date for Title II purposes.

DATED this 10 day of February, 1992.

S/ JAMES O. BLUSOM

JAMES O. ELLISON
Chief United States District Judge

SUBMITTED BY:

TONY M. GRAHAM United States Attorney

PHIL PINNELL, OBA #7169
Assistant United States Attorney

LEAVELL RESOURCES CORP.,	
Plaintiff,)
vs.	Case No. 91-C-850 E
PAYSAR OIL PROPERTIES, INC., ROBERT GORDON EQUIPMENT, INC., ROBERT GORDON OIL CO., ELDON individual, DIXIE GORDON, an individual, ASSOCIATED NATURAL GAS, INC., and LINGAS CO.	Case No. 31-C-850 E
Defendants.)	10 10

NOTICE OF DISMISSAL

The plaintiff, Leavell Resources Corp., pursuant to Rule 41(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, does hereby dismiss all its claims against defendants, Paysar Oil Properties, Inc., Robert Gordon Equipment, Inc., Robert Gordon Oil Co., Eldon Gordon, Dixie Gordon, and Lingas Co. with prejudice to the refiling of same at a later date against these defendants for the reason that this dispute has been settled among them. The plaintiff further advises the Court that none of these defendants have filed an answer or a motion for summary judgment in this layer.

H TRATTNER, OBA #9079 CHARLES B. DAVIS, OBA #2189 Suite 165, 5555 N.W. Grand Boulevard Oklahoma City, OK 73112 (405) 947-6380

Attorneys for Plaintiff Leavell Resources Corp.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, Patrick H. Kernan, hereby certify that on the ____ day of January, 1992, 1991, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to R. Brent Blackstock, Blackstock & Blackstock, 5310 E. 31st Street, Suite 520, Tulsa, OK 74135, and Patrick H. Kernan, Kernan & Kernan, 4500 South Garnett, Suite 900, Tulsa, OK 74136, attorney for defendants, Paysar Oil Properties, Inc., Robert Gordon Equipment, Inc., Robert Gordon Oil Co., Eldon Gordon, Dixie Gordon and Lingas Co.

H. Trauner

TRACEY W. LAYTON,	2-10-92 M
Plaintif	f, }
vs.	No. 91-C-945-B
DEE W. ROSELL and JEFFREY J. HARRISON,	
Defendan) ts.)

ORDER

Before the Court is the motion of the Defendants for partial dismissal. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Defendants, two Tulsa police officers, alleging that Defendants' conduct in effecting Plaintiff's arrest on December 30, 1990, constituted excessive force. Paragraph 6 of Plaintiff's Complaint alleges in part that the "excessive use of force constitutes a deprivation of a right secured by the United States Constitution, Amendments IV and XIV "

In the present motion, Defendants assert that the Complaint fails to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and to that extent should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) Fed.R.Civ.P. In support, Defendants point to <u>Graham v. Connor</u>, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), which held that an excessive force claim of this type is to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard rather than under a substantive due process standard. <u>Id</u>. at 395. See also, <u>Zuchel v. Spinharney</u>, 890 F.2d 273, 274 n. 2 (10th Cir. 1989).

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Plaintiff responds by conceding that the Fourth Amendment is the appropriate standard, and stating that the Complaint's invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment was merely an acknowledgment of the incorporation doctrine which made the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. Therefore, the motion will be GRANTED to the extent that it is hereby clarified and understood between the parties that the Fourth Amendment provides the standard for ultimate disposition of Plaintiff's claim.

It is the order of the Court that the motion of the Defendants for partial dismissal is hereby GRANTED as to any claim directly under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

IT IS SO ORDERED this May of February, 1992.

THOMAS R. BRETT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 92

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY CO.,
A FOREIGN CORPORATION,

PLAINTIFF,

-vs
THE CITY OF TULSA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,

DEFENDANT.

ORDER

NOW, on this ________, day of ________, 1992, for good cause shown, the Court finds the Complaint of the plaintiff, State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., should be allowed to be dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPROVED:

SELMAN AND STAUFFER, INC.

BY:

NEAL E. STAUFFER, OBA #13168 JOSEPH R. ROBERTS, OBA #7639

700 Petroleum Club Bldg.

Tulsa, OK 74119

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

DAVID L. PAULING

Assistant City Attorney 200 Civic Center #316

Tulsa, OK 74103

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

FILED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

FEB 1 0 1992

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY A FOREIGN CORPORATION,	co.,)) 	Richard M. Lawrence, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT
PLAINTIF	F,)		
-vs-)	CASE NO.	91-C-671-E
THE CITY OF TULSA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,) AL)		
DEFENDANT	r.)		
1	ORDER		
NOW, on this	_day of	- Jeb	_, 1992, for good
cause shown, the Court finds	the Comp	plaint of the	plaintiff, State
Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,	should	be allowed	to be dismissed
without prejudice.			
IT IS SO ORDERED.			
		《》(李杰韦东节约)	o. ruson
APPROVED:	UNITED	STATES DISTR	RICT JUDGE
SELMAN AND STAUFFER, INC.			
BY: NEAL E STAUFFER, OBA #1310	- 8		
700 Petroleum Club Bldg. Tulsa, OK 74119	39		
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF			
DAVID L. PAULING	-		

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

Assistant City Aptorney

200 Civic Center, Tulsa, OK 74103

FILEI

FEB 1 0 1992

BRIAN COWAN,)	C.
Plaintiff,)	Richard M. Lawrence, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT
vs.) No. 91-C-837-E	
STATE OF OKLAHOMA EX REL. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,)))	
Defendant.) }	

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) Fed.R.Civ.P. or, in alternative, for summary judgment under Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. Court has reviewed the record, the arguments of the parties and the applicable law and finds that Plaintiff's claim does state a cause of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act; therefore Defendant's motion should be denied insofar as it rests upon the authority of Rule 12(b)(6). The Court further finds that material facts are in dispute as to whether Plaintiff's position is exempt from the reaches of the F.L.S.A.; therefore Defendant's motion, in the alternative, for summary judgment should also be denied.

So ORDERED this day of February, 1992.

ELLISON. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FILED

FEB 1 0 1992

Richard M. Lawrence, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT

ANNABELLE WINTERS d/b/a SHARP'S PAWN SHOP,

Plaintiff,

vs.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF OSAGE COUNTY, OKLAHOMA, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 90-C-508-F I L E D

FEB | 3 1992

RICHARD MALLAWISHUS SIAPR

ORDER

The Court has for consideration the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate. That Report and Recommendation, filed May 15, 1991, was affirmed by Judge Cook on the grounds that no objections had been filed thereto. Subsequently, it was learned that Plaintiff had not received a copy of the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation. Therefore, Judge Cook vacated his Order Affirming and granted Plaintiff time to file her objections. In the interim, the case has been transferred to the undersigned. Having reviewed the record and the relevant authorities this Court now affirms the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation in all respects.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied; Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

So ORDERED this 16 day of February, 1992.

JAMES O. ELLISON, Chief Judge UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FILED

PATTY ANN FREEMAN,

Plaintiff,

FEB 1 0 1992

Richard M. Lawrence, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT

vs.

BARBARA SNOW, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 90-C-19-E

FILED

FEB | 3 1992

ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be granted. Specifically, the Magistrate noted that Petitioner had failed to respond to Defendants' motion as directed by the Magistrate. Pursuant to Local Rule 32(D), parties were given ten (10) days to file any objections to the Report with supporting brief. The Court finds that the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation should be affirmed.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted.

So ORDERED this _______day of February, 1992.

JAMES O. ELLISON, Chief Judge UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



	JUDGMENT HE STATE OF ON A POWE
Defendants.	FEB 1 3 1972
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF OSAGE COUNTY, OKLAHOMA, et al.,	FILED
vs.) No. 90-C-508-E
Plaintiff,)
ANNABELLE WINTERS d/b/a SHARP'S PAWN SHOP,))

This action came on for consideration by the Court, Honorable James O. Ellison, District Judge, presiding, and the issues having been duly considered and a decision having been duly rendered,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Plaintiff take nothing from the Defendants, and that the action be dismissed on the merits.

So ORDERED this 12 10th day of February, 1992.

JAMES

ELLISON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE



RAYMOND E. CESMAT,

Plaintiff,

vs.

No. 90-C-1056-B

MICHAEL'S RANCH, a Nevada Limited Partnership, AMERICAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, A. LEROY FOSTER and A. S. DENNISON,

Defendants.

J U D G M E N T

In keeping with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered this date, Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the Defendant, Michael's Ranch, a Nevada limited partnership, and against the Plaintiff, Raymond E. Cesmat, denying Plaintiff's claim for foreclosure of the subject real property. Plaintiff's action against said Defendant is hereby dismissed. Further, the Court concludes the first mortgage lien on said property is held by John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company; the second mortgage lien on the subject real property is held by the American Bank and Trust Company of Sapulpa, Oklahoma, and a third lien in accordance with a deed of trust to said real property is in A. Leroy Foster and A.S. Dennison. The parties shall pay their own respective attorneys fees and any claim for costs shall be timely submitted pursuant to Local Rule 6.

DATED this ______ day of February, 1992.

THOMÁS R. BRETT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FILED

FEB 7 1992

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

Richard M. Lawrence, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT

GLEN HURT and SUE HURT

PLAINTIFFS

v.

NO. 91-C-175-QE

PETERSON FARMS, INC.

DEFENDANT

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

On this 7th day of 1els, 1992, comes on for consideration the joint Motion of all parties for dismissal of the above styled and numbered cause of action with prejudice.

From the motion and the file the Court is well advised in the premises and herewith orders the above styled and numbered cause of action dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 7th day of 4ds, 1992.

S/ JAMES O. ELLISON
U.S. District Judge

FILE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

FEB 7 1992

LEONARD ARABIA, et al,))	Sichard M. Lawrence, Cl U. S. DISTRICT COUR CONTROL DISTRICT OF OKLAHON
Plaintiff(s),	
vs.)	No. 89-C-91-B
GIANT PETROLEUM, INC., et al,))	
<pre>Defendant(s).)</pre>	

JUDGMENT DISMISSING ACTION BY REASON OF SETTLEMENT

The Court has been advised by counsel that this action has been settled, or is in the process of being settled. Therefore, it is not necessary that the action remain upon the calendar of the Court.

IT IS ORDERED that the action is dismissed without prejudice. The Court retains complete jurisdiction to vacate this Order and to reopen the action upon cause shown that settlement has not been completed and further litigation is necessary.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk forthwith serve copies of this Judgment by United States mail upon the attorneys for the parties appearing in this action.

The state of the s
IT IS SO ORDERED this
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: that this case is set for hearing
on Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement on Thursday,
March 12, 1992 at 2:00 p.m
United States District Judge

THOMAS R. BRETT

ILED

FEB 71992

ROGER ALLEN LONG and DONNA RAE HAMILTON,

Plaintiffs,

Richard M. Lawrence, Clerk U. S. DISTRICT COURT IVERTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

vs.

EDWARD L. JOHNSON, d/b/a CANEY VALLEY SPEEDWAY, and GARY GORBY,

Defendants.

No. 91-C-450-

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

All parties to the above entitled action, by and through their counsels of record, hereby stipulate that they dismiss any and all claims, counterclaims or other causes of action which have been asserted in the past or which are capable of assertion in the future with prejudice to the right of refiling the same.

Bruce A Peabody, OBA #6995 Attorney at Law Post Office Box 2006 Bartlesville, OK 74005 (918) 336-4100

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS/ THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS Min Tun

S. M. Fallis, Jr., OBA # 2813
W. Kirk Turner, OBA # 13791
NICHOLS, WOLFE, STAMPER,
NALLY & FALLIS, INC.
400 Old City Hall Building
124 East Fourth Street
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103-4004
(918) 584-5182

AND

Steve Conatser, OBA # 1839 CONATSER & CONATSER 415 South Dewey, Suite 205 Bartlesville, Oklahoma 74003 (918) 336-3333

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS/ THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the 7^{+} day of February, 1992, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing pleading, with proper postage fully prepaid thereon, to:

Bruce A. Peabody P.O. Box 2006 Bartlesville, OK 74005

W. Kirk Turner

H' I I I I I

JINX THOELE,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 91-C-446-B

PIONEER LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, an Illinois Corporation, and NORMAN WYATT,

Defendants.

ORDER

This matter comes on for consideration upon the Motion to Remand filed by Plaintiff, Jinx Thoele, and upon Defendant's Objection to Remand.

Plaintiff filed suit in Oklahoma State District Court in and for Tulsa County on May 30, 1991, alleging that Defendants, Pioneer Life Insurance Company and Norman Wyatt, improperly rejected claims filed by Plaintiff for medical care and treatment. Plaintiff's state action included claims for breach of contract, bad faith, and negligence.

Defendants removed the case on June 25, 1991, on grounds that this Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims due to the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1447(c).

The issues before the Court are whether Pioneer Life Insurance Company's policy is an employee welfare benefit plan under the protection of ERISA, and, if so, whether ERISA pre-empts the state law claims. Because the Court finds that the insurance policy

 l_f

issued by Pioneer is not an ERISA plan, a determination of preemption is not necessary.

An "employee welfare benefit plan" is defined under ERISA as:

[a]ny plan, fund or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through he purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability . . .

29 U.S.C. §1002(1).

The court in Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S.

1 (1987) set out the legislative intent regarding the term "plan":

Congress intended pre-emption to afford employees the advantages of a uniform set of administrative procedures governed by a single set of regulations. This concern only arises, however, with respect to benefits whose provision by nature requires an ongoing administrative program to meet the employers' obligation. It is for this reason that Congress pre-empted state laws relating to plans rather than simply to benefits.

Pursuant to authority granted in 29 U.S.C. §1135, the Secretary of Labor has issued regulations further defining and excluding certain insurance programs from the umbrella of ERISA coverage. The purchase of insurance will not be treated as an Employee Welfare Benefit Plan under ERISA if all of the following are satisfied:

- (1) No contributions are made by an employer or employee organization;
- (2) Participation [in] the program is completely voluntary for employees or members;
- (3) The sole functions of the employer or employee

organization with respect to the program are, without endorsing the program, to permit the insurer to publicize the program to employees or members, to collect premiums through payroll deductions or dues checkoffs and to remit them to the insurer; and

(4) The employer or employee organization receives no consideration in the form of cash or otherwise in connection with the program, other than reasonable compensation, excluding any profit, for administrative services actually rendered in connection with payroll deductions or dues checkoffs.

29 C.F.R. §2510.3-1(j).

In the instant case, the Court finds that all four criteria have been met. There is no indication in the record that the employer, Harvard Terrace, made contributions to the plan; on the contrary, premiums were paid through deduction of plaintiff's salary. Participation by the plaintiff was voluntary. The sole function of Harvard Terrace was to collect and remit the premium by payroll deduction, without endorsing the plan; in fact it endorsed the Blue Cross and Blue Shield plan in which other employees participated but which the plaintiff refused as too expensive. Finally, there is no evidence that Harvard Terrace received consideration in connection with the program.

The Defendant relies on <u>Kanne v. Connecticut General Life Ins.</u>

<u>Co.</u>, 867 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1988) for the proposition that an ERISA plan exists where the employer only performs minor administerial tasks. However, central to the holding in <u>Kanne</u> was that the employer endorsed the plan within the meaning of 29 C.F.R. §1510.3-1(j)(3). Where the employer's sole involvement is the collection and remittance of premiums, the employer has not established or maintained a plan within the definition of 29 U.S.C. §1002(1).

Otto v. Variable Annuity Life Ins., 814 F. 2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1026 (1988).

The Court concludes that the insurance plan issued by the Defendant was not maintained or established by the Plaintiff's employer and thus was not subject to the provisions of ERISA. Court further concludes that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to decide this action. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand should be and is hereby SUSTAINED.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS ______ day of February, 1992.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CHARLES WALDEN,	Richard M. Lawrenca, Clerk U. S. DISTRICT COURT LEMIERE LISTRICT OF VELLUOMA)
Plaintiff,)
v.) Case No.: 90-C-724-B
UNUM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,)))
Defendant.))

STIPULATED DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs stipulate to the dismissal of the instant action against Unum Life Insurance Company of America, with prejudice.

Bruce H. Harlton 1104 East 21st Place

Tulsa, Oklahoma 74114

Steven R. Hickman, Esq.

Frazier & Frazier

1700 Southwest Boulevard

Suite 100

Post Office Box 799

Túlsa, Oklahoma 74101

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF **CHARLES WALDEN**

- of the firm -

The Law Office of Robert H. Alexander, Jr., p.c.

Post Office Box 868

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73101-0868

(405) 232-0803

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT UNUM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF **AMERICA**

FEB 61992 H-

MARY BULLOCK,	Mobaci (d. seurence, Ofici U. S. from a final seurence, Ofici ton a final seurence
Debtor/Appellant, v.))) No. 91-C-194-E
CLARK DAVENPORT SNELL, et al.,) Bankruptcy No. 89-01413-C
Appellees.)

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

On this day of February, 1992, the motion of Debtor/Appellant Mary Bullock comes before the Court requesting that the Court dismiss appellant's appeal. Being fully advised of the premises, the Court finds that the motion should be granted. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Debtor/Appellant's appeal is dismissed.

James O. Ellison U.S. District Judge

Dism-ND.Ord

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FEB 6 1992 d

FEI	DERAL	DEPOSIT	INSURANCE	CORPORATION,
in	its	corporate	capacity,	,

Richard M. Lawrence, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT

Plaintiff,

vs.

No. 89-C-144-E

HENDERSON HILLS SHOPS, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

AGREED JUDGMENT

This cause coming on for hearing this 6th day of Library, 1992, before the undersigned Judge, the Plaintiff appearing by and through its attorneys of record and the subject Defendant parties appearing pro se, and it appearing to the Court that this is a suit upon a promissory note, and for foreclosure of a mortgage upon real estate securing the same, which said real estate is located in the County of Creek, State of Oklahoma;

It further appearing to the Court that due and legal service was properly obtained by serving the undersigned defendants with summons herein more than 20 days prior to this date;

And it further appearing to the Court that the defendants Tillman M. Hershberger, Raymond Doyal Hoover, and Robert J. Nale have answered and admitted the allegations of the Complaint, the Court further finds and adjudges as follows:

1. The subject Defendants, Tillman M. Hershberger, Raymond Doyal Hoover, and Robert J. Nale, are individuals residing in Creek County, Oklahoma. Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this judicial district.

- 2. The real property involved in this matter is located in Creek County, State of Oklahoma.
- 3. On or about August 21, 1982, Defendant Henderson Hills Shops, Inc. executed a promissory note in the principal sum of \$320,000.00 in favor of Century Bank (the "Note").
- 4. As of the 30th day of August, 1991, the outstanding principal balance of the Note is \$233,333.75 and the accrued interest as of the same date is \$128,034.04. Interest continues to accrue thereon in accordance with the terms of the Mortgage at the rate of \$102.28 per diem.
- 5. FDIC, in its corporate capacity, is successor to all of the Bank's right, title and interest in the Note and all related mortgages, security agreements and guaranties.
- 6. Although demand has been made upon the Defendant Henderson Hills Shops, Inc. by FDIC, Defendant Henderson Hills Shops, Inc. has failed to pay the indebtedness due pursuant to the Note, and is in default thereunder.
- 7. Pursuant to the terms of the Note, FDIC has previously declared and does again hereby declare all the indebtedness evidenced by the Note (the "Indebtedness") to be immediately due and payable.
- 8. Pursuant to the terms of the Note, FDIC is entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee.
- 9. As security for the indebtedness evidenced by the Note, Defendant Henderson Hills Shops, Inc. executed and delivered to the Bank a mortgage and security agreement (the "Mortgage"), and an assignment of rentals (the "Assignment of Rentals"), both dated August 1, 1982.

- 10. As additional security for the Indebtedness, Defendant C. A. Henderson executed and delivered to the Bank on August 1, 1982, a guaranty (the "Guaranty") of the Indebtedness, which was reaffirmed on August 1, 1985.
- 11. The Mortgage and the Assignment of Rentals grant to FDIC, in its corporate capacity, as successor-in-interest to Century Bank, a mortgage lien upon, and an assignment of leases and rents pertaining to, the following described real estate and all fixtures of the debtors installed or located thereon:

Beginning at a point North 89°59'35" West a distance of 709.89 feet, thence South 00°1'35" East a distance of 358.60 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 2, Township 17 North, Range 11 East, Creek County, Oklahoma, thence South 00°1'35" East a distance of 68 feet, thence South 89°59'35" East a distance of 62.3 feet, thence South 00°1'35" East a distance of 82 feet, thence North 89°59'35" West a distance of 140 feet, thence North 00°1'35" West a distance of 150.00 feet, thence South 89°59'35" East a distance of 77.7 feet to point of beginning, containing 0.384 acres more or less.

Said property is referred to hereafter as the "Property". The mortgage tax due and owing on the Mortgage was paid in full to the Treasurer of Creek County. The Mortgage was recorded in the office of the County Clerk of Creek County on November 5, 1982, in Book 126, Page 1175. The Assignment of Rentals was recorded in the office of the County Clerk of Creek County on November 5, 1982, in Book 126 at Page 1157. A fixture financing statement (the "Fixture Filing") was recorded in the office of the County Clerk of Creek County in Book 115 at Page 2222, and re-recorded in Book 116 at Page 47.

12. The Mortgage, the Assignment of Rentals and the Fixture Filing secure the indebtedness evidenced by the Note, and by virtue

of the default of the Defendant Henderson Hills Shops, Inc. under the Note, FDIC is entitled to foreclose the Mortgage, the Assignment of Leases and the Assignment of Rentals.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that the Plaintiff have and recover from Defendants Tillman M. Hershberger, Raymond Doyal Hoover, and Robert J. Nale judgment in rem, forclosing any and all right, title, and interest each of them may claim in and to the subject property.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that an Order of Sale shall issue to the Sheriff of Creek County, Oklahoma, commanding him to advertise and sell, according to law, all of the right, title, or interest of Defendants Tillman M. Hershberger, Raymond Doyal Hoover, and Robert J. Nale in and to the Property, and to apply the proceeds arising from the sale in accordance with the separate Judgment as to Defendants Henderson Hills Shops, Inc. and C. A. Henderson entered simultaneously this day.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that such sale shall be made pursuant to the laws of the State of Oklahoma concerning special execution, appraisal, notice of sale, return of sale, confirmation and notice of confirmation, including, without limitation Okla. Stat. tit. 12 §§759, 764, 765 and 766 (1991).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by this Court that from and after the date of sale of the Property under and by virtue of this judgment and decree, the Defendants Tillman M. Hershberger, Raymond Doyal Hoover, and Robert J. Nale and all persons claiming under them, since the filing of the Complaint herein, be, and they are forever barred and foreclosed of and from

any and every lien upon, right, title, interest, estate or equity of, in, or to the Property, or any part thereof.

FOR ALL OF WHICH, LET EXECUTION ISSUE.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPROVED:

Bradley K. Beasley, OBA No. 628
R. David Whitaker, OBA No. 10520
Leslie Zieren, OBA No. 9999
of BOESCHE, McDERMOTT & ESKRIDGE
800 ONEOK Plaza
100 West Fifth Street
Tulsa, OK 74103
(918) 583-1777

ATTORNEYS FOR FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

APPROVED: Journal Entry of Judgment 89-C-144-E, U. S. Dist. Ct. N. D. Oklahoma

Tillman M. Hershberger

Raymond Doval Hoover

Róbert J. Nale

JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION FILED

January 21, 1992

PATRICIA D. HOWARD CLERK OF THE PANEL

DOCKET NO. 875

BEFORE THE JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION IN RE ASBESTOS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION (NO. VI)

(SEE ATTACHED SCHEDULE CTO-11)


91-C-893-C CONDITIONAL TRANSFER ORDER

On July 29, 1991, the Panel transferred 27,880 civil actions to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1407. Since that time, more than 1,500 additional actions have been transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. With the consent of that court, all such actions have been assigned to the Honorable Charles R. Weiner.

It appears that the actions listed on the attached schedule involve questions of fact which are common to the actions previously transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and assigned to Judge Weiner.

Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 120 F.R.D. 251, 258, the actions on the attached schedule are hereby transferred under 28 U.S.C. §1407 to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for the reasons stated in the opinion and order of July 29, 1991, (771 F.Supp. 415), as corrected on October 1, 1991, October 18, 1991, November 22, 1991, and December 9, 1991, and, with the consent of that court, assigned to the Honorable Charles R. Weiner.

This order does not become effective until it is filed in the office of the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The transmittal of this order to said Clerk shall be stayed fifteen (15) days from the entry thereof and if any party files a notice of opposition with the Clerk of the Panel within this fifteen (15) day period, the stay will be continued until further order of the Panel.



FOR PHE PANEL:

Saturday

Patricia D. Howard

Clerk of the Panel

A TRUE COPY CERTIFIED TO FROM THE RECA

DATED: _

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY DE

DESUTY CLERK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COU

ATTEST POLICING PANEL OF COLORS OF CHIEF STREET PANEL OF CHIEF STREET STREET

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JAN. 21, 1992

PATRICIA D. HOWARD CLERK OF THE PANEL

SCHEDULE CTO-11 - TAG ALONG CASES DOCKET NO. 875 - IN RE ASBESTOS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION (NO. VI)

DISTRICT	<u>D1</u>	V CIVIL ACTIONA	DISTRICT	<u>D1</u>	Y CIVIL ACTION#	DISTRICT	DIA	CIVIL ACTIONS	
ALABAMA NORTHERN			NORTH CA	NORTH CAROLINA MIDDLE			TEXAS EASTERN		
		91-2985	NC.,M.					86-152	
AL.,N.	2	91-2998	•			TX.,E.			
AL.,N.	2	92-56	NEBRASKA			TX.E.		97-500	
			NE.	8	9 0- 70 7	TX.E.		97-419	
GEORGIA N			NE.	8	90-700	TX.,E.	1	97-7//	
GA.,N.		91-2832	NE.	8	90-711	ΤΧ., E.	•	97-07E	
		91-2983	445	•	00 740	TXE.	i	87-1045	
		91-2984	NE.	8	90-715	TXE.	i	87-1280	
		91-2985	NE.	8	90-715 90-717	TXE.	•	87-1400	
		91-2986				TXE.	1	87-1416	
		91-2987	NEW JERSE	Y		TX.,E.			
		91-3071	NJ.	2	91-5257		•		
GA.,N.	1	91-3096	NJ.	2	91-5355	TEXAS NOR	HERN		
		91-3097	NJ.	2	91-5356			91-2528	
		91-3098	NJ.	2	91-5366	TX.,N.	3	91.2528	
GA. N.	1	91-3099				TX.,N.	ž	01.5570	
GA.,N.	1	91-3125	NEW YORK	NORT	HERN	TX.,N.	ž	01-2718	
			NY.,N.	1	91-1363	TX.,N.		91-2719	
GEORGIA SC			NY.,N.	1	91-1444	,	-	71-2717	
GA.,S.	2	91-292				HATU			
GA.,\$.	2	91-293	NEW YORK	TUO	HERN .	UT:	2	90-157	
			NY.,S.	1	91-5780	•••	•	70-137	
ILLINOIS S					91-6399	VIRGINIA E	ACTED	U	
		91-4274			91-8404	VA.,E.			
11.,5.					91-8405	*****	•	76-13	
lt.,s.			_			WASHINGTON	UECT	EDU	
īL.,S.	4	91-4279	OKLAHOMA N	ORTH	ERN	WA.,V.	_	91-5522	
			OK.,N.	4	91-893	******	•	71-3322	
INDIANA SOUTHERN			•		-	WISCONSIN	CASTE	ħu	
IN.,\$.	3	90-168	PENNSYLVAN	IA W	ESTERN	WI.,E.			
IN.,S.	3	90-172	PALINE	-2-	91-1337 E (NUSE	***,6*	4	91-1384	
IN.,S.	3	90-17 9	PA+,W-	2	98-13 El Bried	WEST VIRGI		*	
IN.,S.	3	90-188			-02-	Ws.		91-1257	
			SOUTH CARO	LINA		mv.,u.	,	71-1237	
KENTUCKY EASTERN			sc.	2	91-3643				
KY.,E.		90-279	sc.						
KY.,E.	6	91-73	sc. sc.	2	91-3645				
			sc.	2	91-3652				
LOUISIANA W	ESTE	RN	SC.	2	91-3667				
LA.,W.	2	91-2676	sc.	2	91-3668				
LA., W	3	88-57	sc.		91-3683				
			sc.		91-3684				
MARYLAND					91-3808				
HD.	1 (91-3458	-						
HD.		91-3468	TENNESSEE E	ASTE	RN				
ю.	_	71-3513	_	_	91-155				
HD.	_	71-3515	-	-	91-83				
MD.	_	71-3516		~					
MD. 1		1-3517	TENNESSEE M	IDD!	E				
HD. 1		1-3703			91-954 to () (LC, <)	1			
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MERILEE CHAMBERS, JAMES W. KNAPP, JR., RONALD LANGDON, ROBERT LORENZEN, WILLIAM MCLAIN,) WILLIAM MILLER, DENNIS NICHOLS,) OSWALDO OLIVEROS, RONALD POTTS, WYLIE REED, LESTER GREEN, CARL J. DOSS, LARRY D. FOLEY, MELVIN) C. GREEN, JOSEPH R. HERNANDEZ, WALT R. SHILLING, VERNON B. BILLINGSLEY, JERRY E. HONEYCUTT, JUNIOR J. HURST, WILLIAM RAY TIPTON, RAYMOND L. ANDREWS, LEONARD A. BOSWELL, ROGER KENT JONES, JAMES A. KANE, HUGH JAMES) LENAHAN, DAVID G. MILLER, CHARLES E. OSTERHOUT, GENE A. PARK, JAMES K. RUSHER, WILLIAM C. SIDES, TROY L. WILKERSON, BILLY L. EPPERSON, III, SAM RIDER, JR., CURTIS A. RAYON, ROGER L. ANDREWS, ALBERT D. CHANDLER, BUEL L. DEASON, MARK MARQUIS, JEAN RUST, DAVID JOICE, KENNETH JONES, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated, and FABSCO, Inc.,

Plaintiffs.

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GEORGE R. BELTZ, THOMAS RINCON, DON AKERS, and STEVE MARTIN, Trustees of Diversified Industrial Group Health Plan, 22 DIVERSIFIED INDUSTRIAL GROUP, DIVERSIFIED INDUSTRIAL GROUP HEALTH PLAN, DIVERSIFIED INDUSTRIAL GROUP TRUST, OAK TREE) ADMINISTRATORS, INC., and INTERNATIONAL UNION OF PETROLEUM) AND INDUSTRIAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO,

Defendants.

Case No.: 91 C 464 E

ORDER FOR DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 41(a)(1)(ii)

FILED

6 1992 FEB

Richard M. Lawrence, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to the stipulation of all parties, that this action be, and hereby is, dismissed with prejudice. Each party to bear his, her or its own costs and attorneys fees except as otherwise agreed to by the parties in a separate agreement.

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED: 2/6/92

BY THINK IN THISON

Judge, United States District Court

order.dig

STATE FEDERAL SAVINGS ASSOCIATION,)
by and through its Conservator,)
Resolution Trust Corporation, as)
successor in interest to certain)
assets of State Federal Savings)
and Loan Association,)

Plaintiff

Defendants.

vs.

JOHN G. ARNOLD, JR.; ARNOLD ENTERPRISES, INC., an Oklahoma corporation; DESIGN PROPERTIES, INC., an Oklahoma corporation; JOHN CANTRELL, Treasurer, Tulsa County, Oklahoma; BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Tulsa County, Oklahoma; SOONER FEDERAL SAVINGS ASSOCIATION, by and through its Receiver, Resolution Trust Corporation; FIRST GIBRALTAR BANK, F.S.B., SAN ANTONIO; STEVEN M. HARRIS; AND EVELYN M. HARRIS;

FEB 6 1992 A

Richard M. Lawrence, Clerk U. S. DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKUAHOMA

No. 90-C-808-B

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Harris' and Plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff initiated this action seeking to recover on a promissory note owed Plaintiff by Defendant John G. Arnold, to foreclose a mortgage securing the debt, and reformation of the mortgage.

In the Pretrial Order the parties agreed that the following numbered facts are undisputed. The parties have further agreed to submit the matter to the Court for decision.

1. Plaintiff RTC is a national corporation organized and



existing under the laws of the United States of America, authorized to do business in the State of Oklahoma.

- 2. Defendant John G. Arnold, Jr. is a resident of Tulsa County, State of Oklahoma.
- 3. Defendant John G. Arnold, Jr. is the president of Defendant Arnold Enterprises, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation, and of Defendant Design Properties, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation.
- 4. Defendants Steven M. Harris and Evelyn M. Harris are husband and wife, residing at 7002 South Birmingham Court, Tulsa, Oklahoma.
- 5. Defendant First Gibraltar Bank, F.S.B., San Antonio, is the holder and owner of a mortgage interest in the Harris' 7002 South Birmingham Court property.
- 6. Lot 5, block 3, SHERRELWOOD, an addition to the City of Tulsa, was caused to be split into two lots in 1974 by Max Heidenreich, the vice president, of Premier Properties, Inc., the then owner of Lot 5.
- 7. The lot split resulted in the creation of two separate lots, one lying generally to the north of the lot split boundary (now the Arnold property to be foreclosed) and one lying generally to the south of the lot split boundary (now the Harris' property). The northern portion of Lot 5 was described on the Tulsa Metropolitan Area Planning Commission Lot Split as:

"Tract B:

Beginning at the northwest corner of said Lot 5; Thence easterly along the southerly line of 69th Street and around a curve to the left having a radius of 1107.96 feet for a distance of 25.03 feet to a point of tangency; Thence easterly for a distance of 30.01 feet to a point of curvature; Thence around a curve to the right having a radius of 165 feet for a distance of 184.20 feet to a point of tangency; Thence continuing southeasterly along the southerly line of 69th Street and the northerly line of said Lot 5 for a distance of 59.74 feet; Thence S 74° 38'37" W for a distance of 265.42 feet to a point on the westerly line of said Lot 5; Thence N 5° 5g'11" W along the westerly line of said Lot 5 for a distance of 202.59 feet to the northwest corner thereof and the Point of Beginning."

The southern portion of Lot 5 was described on the Tulsa Metropolitan Area Planning Commission Lot Split as:

"Tract A:

Beginning at the southwest corner of said Lot 5; Thence along the south line of said Lot 5, for a distance of 285 feet to the southeast corner thereof; Thence along the easterly line of said Lot 5 for a distance of 76.70 feet to the northeast corner thereof; Thence westerly along the southerly line of 69th Street and around a curve to the right having a radius of 115 feet for a distance of 69.88 feet to a point of tangency; Thence S 74° 38'37" W for a distance of 265.42 feet to a point on the westerly line of said Lot 5; Thence S 5° 58'11" E along the westerly line of said Lot 5 for a distance of 20 feet to the southwest corner thereof and the Point of Beginning."

- 8. All of the granting instruments as to both portions of Lot 5 since the lot split utilize these descriptions, which do not close.
- 9. The erroneous portion of the description involves the description of the lot split boundary line, although Plaintiff and Defendants Harris disagree as to what specific part of the description is in error.
 - 10. The westerly line of Lot 5 runs at an angle of N 5

degrees 58'11" W or otherwise stated as S 5 degrees 58'11" E.

- 11. On or about August 29, 1974, Premier Properties, Inc., by general warranty deed, transferred title of the southern portion of Lot 5 to Max Heidenreich and his wife, Kathleen Heidenreich, in addition to Lot 7, Block 1, SOUTH OAKS, an addition to the City of Tulsa.
- 12. On or about March 25, 1985, the Heidenreichs transferred title, by general warranty deed, of the southern portion of Lot 5, along with Lot 7, Block 1, SOUTH OAKS, to Defendants Steven and Evelyn Harris, who now own this property, known as 7002 South Birmingham Court, Tulsa, Oklahoma.
- 13. On or about July 19, 1983, Defendant Design Properties, Inc., obtained title by general warranty deed to the north tract of Lot 5, and on or about January 22, 1986, Design Properties, Inc. transferred title by general warranty deed to John G. Arnold, Jr. and his wife, Margot R. Arnold.
- 14. On or about March 31, 1988, Margot R. Arnold quit claimed all of her right, title or interest in and to the north tract of Lot 5 to Defendant John G. Arnold, Jr.
- 15. On or about July 20, 1989, for good and valuable consideration, Defendant John G. Arnold, Jr. made, executed, and delivered unto State Federal Savings and Loan a certain promissory note in the original principal sum of \$64,000.00, plus interest accruing thereunder at the initial annual rate of 12.75%, and having a maturity date of January 16, 1990 ("Note").
 - 16. As security for the repayment of the indebtedness

evidenced by the Note, Defendant John G. Arnold, Jr. made, executed, acknowledged according to law, and delivered to State Federal Savings and Loan a certain real estate mortgage dated July 20, 1989, (filed on July 21, 1989, in Book 5196, Page 874, in the office of the County Clerk of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, with all mortgage tax paid thereon), covering the north tract of Lot 5, block 3, SHERRELWOOD, an addition to the city of Tulsa, all as more particularly described in the copy of the Mortgage, incorporated herein by reference.

- 17. Defendant John G. Arnold, Jr. has failed to make payments according to the express terms of the Note, and is therefore in default.
- 18. Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Note and the Sherrelwood Mortgage, RTC is entitled to recover all costs incurred by it in preserving and insuring the subject property, all taxes on the real property paid by RTC, and all costs of collection, including, without limitation, a reasonable attorney's fee and abstracting expenses, and the same shall be a further charge and lien on the subject property.
- 19. After allowing all just credits, as of July 17, 1990, there is due and owing to RTC under the terms of the Note by Defendant John Arnold, Jr. the unpaid principal balance of \$64,000.00, plus interest accrued through July 17, 1990, in the sum of \$7,595.12, with interest accruing from and after July 17, 1990, until paid in full at the rate of \$21.04 per diem, and a reasonable attorney fee, with interest on the above sums until paid, for which

amounts the Mortgage is a first, prior, and superior lien upon the subject property and premises.

- 20. As to any claim of right, title, or interest in and to the subject real property by Defendant Arnold Enterprises, Inc., said right, title or interest is junior and inferior to the right, title and interest of Plaintiff in and to the real property at issue and should be foreclosed.
- 21. As to any claim of right, title or interest in and to the subject real property by Defendant Design Properties, Inc., said right, title or interest is junior and inferior to the right, title and interest of Plaintiff in and to the real property at issue and should be foreclosed.
- 22. As to any claim of right, title or interest in and to the subject real property by Defendant John Cantrell, Treasurer, Tulsa County, Oklahoma and/or the board of County Commissioners, Tulsa County, Oklahoma, and Sooner Federal Savings Association, by and through its Receiver, Resolution Trust Corporation, said right, title or interest is junior and inferior to the right, title and interest of Plaintiff in and to the real property at issue and should be foreclosed.
- 23. As to any claim of right, title or interest in and to the subject real property by Defendant Steven M. Harris, Evelyn M. Harris, and First Gibraltar Bank, F.S.B., San Antonio, said right, title or interest in and to Defendant Arnold's Mortgaged property to be described by and after the Court's reformation of the boundary line description, is junior and inferior to the right,

title and interest of Plaintiff in and to the real property at issue and should be foreclosed.

- On February 16, 1990, pursuant to Sec. 5(d)(2) of the 24. Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 [as amended by Sec. 301 of The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (the "Act"), as enacted on August 9, 1989] the director of the Office of Thrift Supervision issued Order No. 90-357 and placed State Federal Savings and Loan Association ("State Federal") in Receivership and assumed exclusive custody and control of the property and affairs of it. The Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, through Order No. 90-357, also appointed RTC as the Receiver of State Federal to have "all the powers of a conservator or receiver, as appropriate, granted under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, and (when not inconsistent therewith) any other rights, powers, and privileges possessed by conservators or receivers, as appropriate, of savings associations under this Act and any other provisions of law." The Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision subsequently issued Order No. 90-359, appointing RTC as the Conservator of State Federal Savings Association (the new, operating institution) to have "all the powers of a conservator or receiver, as appropriate, granted under Federal Deposit Insurance Act, and (when not inconsistent therewith) any other rights, powers, and privileges possessed by conservators or receivers, as appropriate, of savings associations under this Act any other provisions of law."
 - 25. Subsequently, certain assets of State Federal were sold

and transferred from RTC as the Receiver for it to State Federal Savings Association, by and through its Conservator, RTC. State Federal Savings Association, by and through its Conservator, RTC, purchased those certain assets that are involved in this action.

- 26. Subsequent to the institution of this lawsuit, on August 16, 1991, the Office of Thrift Supervision appointed the RTC as Receiver for State Federal Savings Association pursuant to OTS Order No. 91-497 and \$5(d)(2)(F) of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 [as amended by Section 301 of the ACT]. RTC accepted the appointment as Receiver for State Federal Savings Association and took possession of it on August 16, 1991. As a result State Federal Savings Association, by and through its Receiver, RTC, has succeeded to certain rights and interests of State Federal Savings Association, previously in Conservatorship, and is accordingly the proper party as a matter of law, as so substituted by the Court, and the holder and owner of the note and mortgage at issue.
- 27. A topographical survey of Lot 5 was performed for the purpose of preparing documents necessary to obtain approval of the split of the lot by B. G. Brummett of Plummer Brummett, an Oklahoma corporation, at the request of Max Heidenreich.
- 28. The topographical survey indicates an existing 10 foot wide sewer easement across Lot 5. Within the boundaries of the easement, the "Proposed Lot Split Line" is drawn.
- 29. Mr. Brummett understood Mr. Heidenreich intended to split Lot 5 along the sewer easement line to intersect the western boundary of Lot 5 approximately 20 feet north of the southwest

corner of Lot 5. Mr. Brummett further understood that one of the reasons for splitting the lot along the easement was to allow access to it by either newly-created lot.

- 30. Mr. Brummett incorrectly recorded his description of the lot split line on the lot split approval documents, including on the topographical survey.
- 31. Max Heidenreich never intended the lot to be split anywhere north of the sewer easement.
- 32. The portion of the north tract of Lot 5 as described in the mortgage contains what appears to be a scrivener's error as to the "1107.96 feet" portion of the description, which was typed as "11-7.96 feet". Said mortgage should be reformed to correct this error.
- 33. During Mr. Heidenreich's ownership of the south tract of Lot 5, he and Mr. Arnold never had a dispute as to the lot split boundary line, nor did Mr. Heidenreich ever exercise any ownership or possessory rights over any part of Lot 5 north of the sewer easement.
- 34. Since he obtained title to the south tract of Lot 5 in 1985, Mr. Harris, believing he owns it, has performed landscaping and maintenance work on a steep hillside on a portion of Lot 5, which includes a portion of the real property north of the sewer easement.
- 35. Mr. Arnold believes the lot split boundary to be along the sewer line within the 10 foot sewer easement. He has never acquiesced to the Harris' ownership, possession, or any claim of

possession of any property north of the sewer easement. He has allowed Mr. Harris to be on his property only to allow Mr. Harris to perform maintenance on part of the property. The fountain is still sitting over the sewer line, as Mr. Harris has not moved it.

- 36. Existing over most of the disputed boundary line is a natural pond, which creates riparian rights and littoral rights in the abutting property owners -- Harris' and Arnold.
- 37. Defendant Mrs. Harris has no idea where the lot split boundary line lies.
- 38. On March 2, 1983, Max A. Heidenreich and Kathleen H. Heidenreich executed a promissory note payable to Sooner Federal Savings and Loan Association in the principal amount of \$175,000 (the "Note").
- 39. Contemporaneous with execution of the Note, Max A. Heidenreich and Kathleen H. Heidenreich executed a mortgage (the "Mortgage"), pledging the following described real property as collateral for the Note:

Lot Seven (7), Block One (1), South Oaks, an Addition to the city of Tulsa, Tulsa County, State of Oklahoma, according to the recorded Plat thereof.

AND

A part of Lot Five (5), Block Three (3), Sherrelwood, an Addition to the City of Tulsa, Tulsa County, State of Oklahoma, according to the recorded plat thereof; being more particularly described as follows, to-wit: BEGINNING at the southwest corner of said Lot 5; thence S 89° 38'29" East along the South line of said Lot 5, for a distance of 285 feet to the Southeast corner thereof; thence N 1° 24'43" East along the Easterly line of said Lot 5 for a distance of 76.70 feet to the

Northeast corner thereof; thence Westerly along the Southerly line of 69th Street and around a curve to the right having a radius of 115 feet for a distance of 69.88 feet to a point of tangency; thence S 74° 38'37" West for a distance of 265.42 feet to a point on the Westerly line of said Lot 5; thence S 5° 58'11" East along the Westerly line of said Lot 5 for a distance of 20 feet to the Southwest corner thereof and the Point of Beginning.

- 40. On March 29, 1985, Max A. Heidenreich and Kathleen M. Heidenreich conveyed the Subject Property by General Warranty Deed to the Harrises, using the description in the above paragraph.
- 41. On April 5, 1985, the Harrises executed a Substitution and Transfer agreement, thereby assuming the indebtedness evidenced by both the Note and the Mortgage and repledging the Subject Property as collateral for the Note.
- 42. First Gibraltar is now the holder and owner of the Note, Mortgage and Substitution and Transfer Agreement by virtue of its acquisition from the Resolution Trust Corporation as Receiver of Sooner Federal Savings Association (the "RTC").
- 43. First Gibraltar, as the holder of a mortgage, which encumbers the Harrises' property at 7002 S. Birmingham Court, Tulsa, Oklahoma, is entitled to reformation of its mortgage to the extent made necessary by and consistent with the Court's reformation of Plaintiff's mortgage.
- 44. John G. Arnold, Jr. is entitled to reformation of his deed to the extent made necessary by and consistent with the Court's reformation of Plaintiff's mortgage.
 - 45. Defendants Harris are entitled to reformation of their

deed to the extent made necessary by and consistent with the Court's reformation of Plaintiff's mortgage.

In construing an instrument, the Court's task is to ascertain the intent of the parties. <u>Cleary Petroleum Corp. v. Harrison</u>, 621 P.2d 528, 532 (Okla 1980). Intention of the parties controls. <u>Geb V. Wilkins</u>, 399 P.2d 456 (Okla 1965).

If possible, intent is to be derived from the four corners of the instrument. Cleary, 621 P.2d at 532. However, when the intent is not clear from the instrument itself, creating an ambiguity or uncertainty in the conveyance, parol evidence as well as the instrument is admissible to show intent. Riedt V. Rock Island Improvement Co., 521 P.2d 79, 83 (Okla. 1974); Cronkhite v. Falkenstein, 352 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1960); Jennings v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 66 P.2d 1069 (Okla. 1937); 15 O.S. §152.

A description in a deed which does not close creates ambiguity in a conveyance rendering parol evidence admissible to explain intent. Blalock v. Johnson, 121 So.2d 604, 609 (Ala. 1960); Hofer v. Carino, 72 A.2d 335 (N.J. 1950); Maxwell v. Maxwell, 123 P.2d 335 (Wash. 1942); Grimes v. Jordan, 260 S.W.2d 220, 223-24 (Tex. Ct. App. 1953); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 115 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1940).

Moreover, when a description does not close, the fact that the parties did not intend the property to be described in the manner set forth, is apparent, and parol evidence is admissible on grounds of mutual mistake. <u>Mathews v. Florida Crossbreeds, Inc.</u>, 330 So.2d 183, 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).

The descriptions in the deeds should be reformed, as Plaintiff

avers, by eliminating the course and distance calls of the present boundary line separating Tracts A and B. The intent of Max Heidenreich to split Lot 5 along the sewer easement line to intersect the western boundary of Lot 5, 20 feet north of the southwest corner of Lot 5, is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Heidenreich Depo., Exh. G; Rupe Aff., Exh. E; Brummett Aff., Exh. F. Further, the record clearly indicates the distance call and bearing description of the lot split line were incorrectly recorded. Brummett Aff., Exh. F.

The reference to the endpoints of the boundary line in the deeds themselves indicate the intent of the parties. Contrary to the Defendant's argument, these specific references, capable of precise location, may be more reliable than course and distance calls. Wallace v. Hirsch, 350 P.2d 560 (Colo. 1960).

The Harrises, as subsequent grantees, are bound by the intent of the original lot splitting parties and any ordered reformation. Reformation may be had as against a party to an instrument and against another taking from him with notice. Clement Mortgage Co. V. Lewis, 253 P. 88 (Okla. 1927); Wise v. Latimer, 109 P.2d 1001 (Okla. 1948); Terrill v. Laney, 193 P.2d 296 (Okla. 1948). From the record, it is clear that Mr. Harris had notice of the intended split from a conversation he had with Mr. Heidenreich at the time of purchase. Heidenreich Depo, Exh. G.

The Court concludes the motion of Defendants Harris for Summary Judgment should be and the same is hereby DENIED. The Court further concludes the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment should be and the same is hereby SUSTAINED.

The Plaintiff's mortgage (Tract B) is reformed to read:

"Beginning at the northwest corner of said Lot 5; Thence easterly along the southerly line of 69th Street and around a curve to the left having a radius of 1107.96 feet for a distance of 25.03 feet to a point of tangency; Thence easterly for a distance of 30.01 feet to a point of curvature; Thence around a curve to the right having a radius of 165 feet for a distance of 184.20 feet to a point of tangency; Thence continuing southeasterly along the southerly line of 69th Street and the northerly line of said Lot 5 for a distance of 59.74 feet; Thence south to a point on the westerly line of said Lot 5; Thence N 5° 58'11" W along the westerly line of said Lot 5 for a distance of 202.59 feet to the northwest corner thereof and the Point of Beginning."

The deed to the Arnold's (Tract B) is reformed to read:

"Beginning at the northwest corner of said Lot 5; Thence easterly along the southerly line of 69th Street and around a curve to the left having a radius of 1107.96 feet for a distance of 25.03 feet to a point of tangency; Thence easterly for a distance of 30.01 feet to a point of curvature; Thence around a curve to the right having a radius of 165 feet for a distance of 184.20 feet to a point of tangency; Thence continuing southeasterly along the southerly line of 69th Street and the northerly line of said Lot 5 for a distance of 59.74 feet; Thence south to a point on the westerly line of said Lot 5; Thence N 5° 58'11" W along the westerly line of said Lot 5 for a distance of 202.59 feet to the northwest corner thereof and the Point of Beginning."

The Defendant, First Gibraltar Bank's mortgage (Tract A) is reformed to read:

"Beginning at the southwest corner of said Lot 5; Thence along the south line of said Lot 5, for a distance of 285 feet to the southeast corner thereof; Thence along the easterly line of said Lot 5 for a distance of 76.70 feet to the northeast corner thereof; Thence westerly along the southerly line of 69th Street and around a curve to the right having a radius of 115 feet for a distance of 69.88 feet to a point of tangency; Thence to a point on the westerly line of said Lot 5; Thence S 5° 58'11" E along the westerly line of said Lot 5 for a distance of 20 feet to the southwest corner thereof and the point of Beginning."

The deed to the Harrises (Tract A) is reformed to read:

"Beginning at the southwest corner of said Lot 5; Thence along the south line of said Lot 5, for a distance of 285 feet to the southeast corner thereof; Thence along the easterly line of said Lot 5 for a distance of 76.70 feet to the northeast corner thereof; Thence westerly along the southerly line of 69th Street and around a curve to the right having a radius of 115 feet for a distance of 69.88 feet to a point of tangency; Thence to a point on the westerly line of said Lot 5; Thence S 5° 58'11" E along the westerly line of said Lot 5 for a distance of 20 feet to the southwest corner thereof and the point of Beginning."

The parties are directed to submit to the Court an agreed judgment foreclosing Plaintiff's note and mortgage and reflecting the reformation of the deeds aforesaid.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS

1

__ day of January,

THOMAS R. BRETT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

FILED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

FEB -6 1992

MAIN MALL ENTERPRISES, INC. d/b/a)
MIDTOWN ADULT THEATRE AND
BOOKSTORE,

NORTH MARKET OF CK

Plaintiff,

v.

No. 92-C-101-B

CITY OF TULSA, ex.rel. DEPARTMENT)
OF FINANCE,

Defendant.

NOTICE OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Main Mall Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Midtown Adult Theatre and Bookstore, and, pursuant to Rule 41 (a) (1) (i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby dismisses this case without prejudice to the refiling of the same.

The Plaintiff would advise this Court that an agreement has been reached between the parties which vitiates the need for this present action. Furthermore, the Defendant has not filed an Answer in this matter.

MARK A. WARMAN, OBA NO. 12920

2211 E. Skelly Drive Tulsa, Oklahoma 74105

(918) 745-6084

Rusself 0679 Rm. 8839

Ward Family Partnership,

Petitioner,

V.

Case No. 91-C-48-I L E D

United States of America and Pauline Quintero,

Respondents.

Respondents.

Richard M. Lawrence, Clerk U. S. DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL

Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the petitioner, Ward Family Partnership, and the respondents, United States of America and Pauline Quintero, stipulate to the dismissal with prejudice of the above-captioned Petition to Quash Summons. The petitioner agrees that the United States may obtain the documents requested in the third-party recordkeeper summons served on the Heritage Bank in Yale, Oklahoma on October 3, 1991.

The parties further agree that each party shall pay its own costs and attorneys fees.

JOHN D. RUSSELL
Trial Attorney
Tax Division
U.S. Department of Justice
Post Office Box 7238
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, D.C. 20044
202-514-8220

Attorney for the United States of America and Pauline Quintero

SANDRA J. PATTON
Tax Matters Partner
Ward Family Partnership
333 American Way
Jennings, OK 74038
918-757-2236

General Partner

5.59N.2188

BILLY CHARLES CAIN,)	
Plaintiff,)	
v.)	91-C-529-E
BOARD OF CORRECTIONS, et al,)	FILMD
Defendants.)	FEB 6/992 0
	ORDER	Manua (1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1

The court has for consideration the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge filed January 8, 1992, in which the Magistrate Judge recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's Civil Rights Complaint Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be granted. No exceptions or objections have been filed and the time for filing such exceptions or objections has expired.

After careful consideration of the record and the issues, the court has concluded that the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge should be and hereby is affirmed.

It is therefore Ordered that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's Civil Rights Complaint Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is granted.

Dated this 60 day of February, 1992.

AMES O. ELLISON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE



KLEIER ADVERTISING, INC., ET AL
 Plaintiff(s),

FILED

vs.

No. 86-C-1015-C

FFR 6 1992

PREMIER PONTIAC, ET AL Defendant(s).

Plehard Li. Lawrence, Clerk 11. 9. DISTRICT COURT 1. 1. LEARN DISTRICT OF OKUMOMA

JUDGMENT DISMISSING ACTION BY REASON OF SETTLEMENT

The Court has been advised by counsel that this action has been settled, or is in the process of being settled. Therefore, it is not necessary that the action remain upon the calendar of the Court.

IT IS ORDERED that the action is dismissed without prejudice. The Court retains complete jurisdiction to vacate this Order and to reopen the action upon cause shown that settlement has not been completed and further litigation is necessary.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk forthwith serve copies of this Judgment by United States mail upon the attorneys for the parties appearing in this action.

Dated this 5 day of 7e huary, 1992

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

FILED

IN THE UNITED DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

FEB 6 1992

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, in its corporate capacity,) Richard M. Lawrence, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiff,)
vs.) No. 89-C-144-E
HENDERSON HILLS SHOPS, INC., et al.,)))
Defendants.)

JUDGMENT

This cause coming on for hearing this <u>oth</u> day of <u>rebruing</u>, 1992, before the undersigned Judge, the parties appearing by and through their attorneys of record, and it appearing to the Court that this is a suit upon a promissory note, and for foreclosure of a mortgage upon real estate securing the same, which said real estate is located in the County of Creek, State of Oklahoma;

It further appearing to the Court that due and legal service was properly obtained by serving the defendants with summons herein more than 20 days prior to this date;

And it further appearing to the Court that the defendants Henderson Hills Shops, Inc., and C. A. Henderson (the "Defendants") have answered and admitted the allegations of the Complaint, the Court further finds and adjudges as follows:

1. On or about August 21, 1982, Defendant Henderson Hills Shops, Inc. executed a promissory note in the principal sum of \$320,000.00 in favor of Century Bank (the "Note").

- 2. As of the 30th day of August, 1991, the outstanding principal balance of the Note is \$233,333.75 and the accrued interest as of the same date is \$128,034.04. Interest continues to accrue thereon in accordance with the terms of the Mortgage at the rate of \$102.28 per diem.
- 3. FDIC, in its corporate capacity, is successor to all of the Bank's right, title and interest in the Note and all related security agreements and guaranties.
- 4. Although demand has been made upon the Defendant Henderson Hills Shops, Inc. by FDIC, Defendant Henderson Hills Shops, Inc. has failed to pay the indebtedness due pursuant to the Note, and is in default thereunder.
- 5. Pursuant to the terms of the Note, FDIC has previously declared and does again hereby declare all the indebtedness evidenced by the Note (the "Indebtedness") to be immediately due and payable.
- 6. Pursuant to the terms of the Note, FDIC is entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee.
- 7. As security for the indebtedness evidenced by the Note, Defendant Henderson Hills Shops, Inc. executed and delivered to the Bank a mortgage and security agreement (the "Mortgage"), and an assignment of rentals (the "Assignment of Rentals"), both dated August 1, 1982.
 - 8. As additional security for the Indebtedness, Defendant

- C. A. Henderson executed and delivered to the Bank on August 1, 1982, a guaranty (the "Guaranty") of the Indebtedness, which was reaffirmed on August 1, 1985.
- 9. The Mortgage and the Assignment of Rentals grant to FDIC, in its corporate capacity, as successor-in-interest to Century Bank, a mortgage lien upon, and an assignment of leases and rents pertaining to, the following described real estate and all fixtures of the debtors installed or located thereon:

Beginning at a point North 89°59'35" West a distance of 709.89 feet, thence South 00°1'35" East a distance of 358.60 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 2, Township 17 North, Range 11 East, Creek County, Oklahoma, thence South 00°1'35" East a distance of 68 feet, thence South 89°59'35" East a distance of 62.3 feet, thence South 00°1'35" East a distance of 82 feet, thence North 89°59'35" West a distance of 140 feet, thence North 00°1'35" West a distance of 150.00 feet, thence South 89°59'35" East a distance of 77.7 feet to point of beginning, containing 0.384 acres more or less.

Said property is referred to hereafter as the "Property". The mortgage tax due and owing on the Mortgage was paid in full to the Treasurer of Creek County. The Mortgage was recorded in the office of the County Clerk of Creek County on November 5, 1982, in Book 126, Page 1175. The Assignment of Rentals was recorded in the office of the County Clerk of Creek County on November 5, 1982, in Book 126 at Page 1157. A fixture financing statement (the "Fixture Filing") was recorded in the office of the County Clerk of Creek County in Book 115 at Page 2222, and re-recorded in Book 116, page 47.

12. The Mortgage, the Assignment of Rentals and the Fixture Filing secure the indebtedness evidenced by the Note, and by virtue

of the default of the Defendant Henderson Hills Shops, Inc. under the Note, FDIC is entitled to foreclose the Mortgage, the Assignment of Leases and the Assignment of Rentals.

13. This Judgment does not resolve all of the claims in this case. The Court hereby determines that there is no just reason for delay for determination of the claims addressed by this Judgment.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that the Plaintiff have and recover from Defendant Henderson Hills Shops, Inc. the principal sum of \$233,333.75, together with accrued interest of \$128,034.04 as of August 30, 1991, interest accruing thereafter in the amount of \$102.28 per diem, a reasonable attorney's fee of \$10,000.00, and the costs of this action.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that an Order of Sale shall issue to the Sheriff of Creek County, Oklahoma, commanding him to advertise and sell, according to law, all of the Defendants' interest in the Property, and to apply the proceeds arising from the sale as follows:

- A. In payment of the costs of said sale and of this action;
 - B. In payment of ad valorem taxes due, if any;
- C. In payment of the principal sum of \$233,333.75 with accrued interest in the amount of \$128,034.04 as of August 30, 1991, with interest continuing to accrue thereafter in the amount of \$102.28 per diem, a reasonable attorney's fee in the amount of \$10,000.00, and the costs of this action; and,

D. That the residue, if any, be paid to the Clerk of this Court to await the further order of the Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that such sale shall be made pursuant to the laws of the State of Oklahoma concerning special execution, appraisal, notice of sale, return of sale, confirmation and notice of confirmation, including without limitation Okla. Stat. Tit. 12 §§759, 764, 765 and 766 (1991).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that if the amount derived from said sale is insufficient to satisfy the judgment granted the Plaintiff, including interest, attorney fees and costs, the Plaintiff shall have judgment against the Defendant Henderson Hills Shops, Inc. for the amount of such deficiency as permitted under Oklahoma law.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by this Court that from and after the date of sale of the Property under and by virtue of this judgment and decree, the Defendants and all persons claiming under them, since the filing of the Complaint herein, be, and they are forever barred and foreclosed of and from any and every lien upon, right, title, interest, estate or equity of, in, or to the Property, or any part thereof.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the issue of the liability of Defendant C. A. Henderson upon the Guaranty be and it hereby is reserved for determination by this Court at a later time.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that no just reason exists for delay of entry of this judgment, and the Clerk of

this Court is directed to enter judgment in accordance with the terms hereof.

For all of which, let execution issue.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPROVED:

Bradley K. Beasley, OBA No. 628
R. David Whitaker, OBA No. 10520
of BOESCHE, McDERMOTT & ESKRIDGE
800 ONEOK Plaza
100 West Fifth Street
Tulsa, OK 74103
(918) 583-1777

ATTORNEY FOR FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

Joseph H. Bocock, Esq. Two Leadership Square 10th Floor Oklahoma City, OK 73102

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS HENDERSON HILLS SHOPS, INC. AND C.A. HENDERSON

ls\HendHills.JE\RDW-8 August 28, 1991

FILE:

DOBIE LANGENKAMP, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

No. 91-C-257-E

Tichard M. Lawrance, Cler U. S. DISTRICT COURT HONHERH DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

HERBERT LINDLEY a/k/a R. H. LINDLEY, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

The Court has for consideration the Motion of R. H. Lindley for withdrawal of the reference. Under the teachings of <u>Langenkamp</u> v. Culp, 111 S.Ct. 330 (1990) and <u>In re Latimer</u>, 918 F.2d 136 (10th Cir. 1990) the Court must deny Mr. Lindley's Motion.

So ORDERED this 47 day of February, 1992.

JAMES O. ELLISON, Chief Judge UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



CLEO	MASHUNKASHEY,
------	---------------

Plaintiff,

vs.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS)
OF OSAGE COUNTY, OKLAHOMA)
and GAIL HEDGCOTH, individually)
and in her official capacity as)
Osage County Assessor,

Defendants.

BETTY MOORE,

Plaintiff,

vs.

BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF OSAGE
COUNTY, OKLAHOMA and
GAIL HEDGCOTH,
individually and in her
official capacity as Osage
County Assessor,

Defendants.

Case No. 91-C-618-B

FEB 05 1992

Case No. 91-C-619-B

ORDER

NOW on this _______ day of ________, 1992, this matter comes on for hearing pursuant to the Joint Stipulation of Dismissal and Application for Dismissal With Prejudice of the parties hereto. The Court, being fully advised in these premises, finds that the Application should be granted.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this cause is dismissed with prejudice.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT CUDGE



intered

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

UNITED SIDING SUPPLY, INC.,

PLAINTIFF,

FILED

VS.

GRADY BROTHERS, INC., RANDY GRADY, AND JACK HOKE,

DEFENDANTS.

NO. 90 C 594 C

FEB 5 - 1992

Richard M. Lawrence, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT

JUDGMENT AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES

NOW, on this 5th day of September, 199%, the above-styled and numbered case comes on pursuant to Plaintiff's motion to assess attorney's fees. Plaintiff appears by and through its attorneys of record, Kivell, Rayment and Francis, by Brian J. Rayment. Defendants, Grady Brothers, Inc., and Jack Hoke, appear by and through their attorneys of record Schoeppel and Curthoys, by Kevin A. Schoeppel. Defendant, Randy Grady, appears by and through his attorneys of record, Richardson & Meier, by Ronald E. Hignight.

The Court, upon due consideration, finds that Plaintiff's motion should be granted.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff, United Siding Supply, Inc., have and recover judgment against the defendants, Grady Brothers, Inc., Jack Hoke, and Randy Grady, and each of them, for attorneys fees in the amount of \$28,059.95.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/S/ JOHN LEO WAGNER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

APPROVAL AS TO FORM:

Brian J. Rayment, OBA #7441 7666 East 61st, Suite 240

Tulsa, Oklahoma 74133

(918) 254-0626

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

Kevin Schoeppel 1408 S. Denver

Tulsa, OK 74119

918-582-5754

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT, GRADY BROTHERS

AND JACK HOKE

Ronald Highight

5727 S. Lewis Tulsa, OK 74105

918-492-7674

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT, RANDY GRADY

uss.att.bjr

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

FEB -5 1997

RICHARD M. LAMMERCE

CLERK

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OK

BOOKER T. SHEPHARD,)
Petitioner,)
Vs.	No. 90-C-42-C
RON CHAMPION, Warden; ATTORNEY GENERAL, for the State of Oklahoma,)))
Respondents.)

ORDER

Before the Court is the motion of petitioner for appointment of counsel to represent him on appeal. By Order of January 8, 1992, the Court denied petitioner's motion for federal habeas corpus relief. Petitioner timely filed his notice of appeal on January 27, 1992. Upon review, the Court does not believe that the issue to be appealed is so complex as to require appointed counsel. In any event, the request is better addressed to the appellate court. See Heath v. United States Parole Comm'n, 788 F.2d 85, 88 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 953 (1986 ("[A]ppointment of counsel on an appeal involving a collateral attack on a conviction is a matter that rests within the discretion of the appeals court.")

M

It is the Order of the Court that the motion of the petitioner, Booker T. Shepard, for appointment of counsel is hereby denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED this _____ day of February, 1992.

H. DALECOOK

United States District Judge

F	T	T	E	-
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	1992 - 1992 //
CHARLES A. ROBINSON,) Richard M. Lawrence, Cler U.S. DISTRICT COURT
PLAINTIFF,) O.S. DISTRICT COURT
v.)) CASE NO. 90-C-1029-B
PRISCILLA ELLIS,	}
DEFENDANT.))

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the jury verdict rendered February 3, 1992, Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff, Charles A. Robinson and against the Defendant, Priscilla Ellis, in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$100,000.00), plus post-judgment interest at the rate of 4.02% per annum (28 U.S.C. § 1961) from February 3, 1992 on said principal sum. Each party is to pay his or her own respective attorney's fees. Costs are assessed against Defendant if timely applied for under Local Rule 6.

DATED this ____ day of February, 1992.

THOMAS R. BRETT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE



WALTER RAY HARVEY,

Plaintiff,

Vs.

No. 90-C-1001-C

WILEY BACKWATER, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Before the Court is the motion of plaintiff for attorney fees. Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and received a jury verdict in his favor against defendant Dan Horne. Plaintiff now seeks fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988. The fees requested are as follows: lead attorney Earl Wolfe records 41 hours of non-court time and 45.5 hours of in-court time, all at a rate of \$200.00 per hour, for a total of \$17,300.00. Associate Charles L. Hamit records 55.9 hours of non-court time and 4.7 hours of incourt time, all at \$100.00 per hour, for a total of \$6,060.00. Thus, plaintiff's total request is \$23,360.00. In response, defendant only objects to Mr. Wolfe's hourly rate of \$200.00.

The Tenth Circuit has stated:

The first step in setting a rate of compensation for the hours reasonably expended is to determine what lawyers of comparable skill and experience practicing in the area in which the litigation occurs would charge for their time. If the lawyer seeking the fee is in private practice, his or her customary rate would be a relevant but not conclusive factor. The hourly rate should be based on the lawyers' skill and experience in civil rights or analogous litigation. Lawyers working outside their fields of expertise may deserve an hourly fee lower than their normal billing rate because of their lack of experience in the civil rights field. Salaried public interest firm lawyers should be assigned a billing rate

equal to their counterparts in expertise in private practice. The quality of the lawyer's performance in the case should also be considered in placing a value on his or her services.

Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 555 (10th Cir. 1983) (footnotes omitted).

Neither party has presented any evidence as to local hourly rates in Tulsa. Mr. Wolfe has presented no evidence as to his "skill and experience" in civil rights litigation. From the Court's observation, Mr. Wolfe's conduct of the trial was more than competent. Upon review, the Court has determined to reduce Mr. Wolfe's hourly rate to \$150.00 for non-court time and \$175.00 for in-court time. The result is \$6,150.00 for non-court time and \$7,962.50 for in-court time. Mr. Wolfe's total request becomes \$14,112.50, and plaintiff's total request is \$20,172.50.

It is the Order of the Court that plaintiff's motion for attorney fees is hereby granted. Plaintiff is awarded fees in the amount of \$20,172.50.

IT IS SO ORDERED this _____ day of February, 1992.

United States District Judge

	FILEL
DAWN ROBINSON, A MINOR BY JAMES ROBINSON, HER FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND,	FEB 5- 1992 M
PLAINTIFF,	Richard M. Lawrence, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT
v .) CASE NO. 91-C-112-B
DOMINO'S PIZZA, INC., A MICHIGAN CORPORATION,)))
DEFENDANT.))

AMENDED JUDGMENT

In accordance with the jury verdict rendered January 30, 1992, Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff, Dawn Robinson, a minor, by her Guardian, Maura Pollock, and against the Defendant, Domino's Pizza, Inc., in the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Dollars (\$75,000.00), plus pre-judgment interest at the rate of 9.58% per annum (12 O.S. § 727) from the date of February 20, 1991, to January 31, 1992, and post-judgment interest at the rate of 4.02% per annum (28 U.S.C. § 1961) from January 31, 1992 on the total of said principal sum and pre-judgment interest. Costs are assessed against Defendant if timely applied for under Local Rule 6.

DATED this <u>f</u> day of February, 1992.

THOMAS R. BRETT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)
Plaintiff,	
vs.)
KRIS MELSON,)
Defendant.)) CIVIL ACTION NO. 91-C-561-B

NOTICE OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff, United States of America, by Tony M. Graham, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma, through Peter Bernhardt, Assistant United States Attorney, hereby gives notice that the above-styled action is hereby dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TONY M. GRAHAM United States Attorney

PETER BERNHARDT, OBA # 741

Assistant United States Attorney

3900 U.S. Courthouse

Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103

(918) 581-7463

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

CLEO	MASHUNKASHEY,

Plaintiff,

vs.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF OSAGE COUNTY, OKLAHOMA and GAIL HEDGCOTH, individually and in her official capacity as) Osage County Assessor,

Defendants.

BETTY MOORE,

Plaintiff,

vs.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF OSAGE COUNTY, OKLAHOMA and GAIL HEDGCOTH, individually and in her official capacity as Osage County Assessor,

Defendants.

Case No. 91-C-618-B

FEB 57 1992

HICHARA IN CONTROL COURTS
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF DELIMINAL

Case No. 91-C-619-B

ORDER

NOW on this _______, 1992, this matter comes on for hearing pursuant to the Joint Stipulation of Dismissal and Application for Dismissal With Prejudice of the parties hereto. The Court, being fully advised in these premises, finds that the Application should be granted.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this cause is dismissed with prejudice.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA I L E D

OKLAHOMA FIXTURE COMPANY, an Oklahoma corporation,	FEB 4 = 1992) Richard M. Lawrence, Clerk
Plaintiff,) U.S. DISTRICT COURT
v.) CASE NO. 91-C-668-E
FIREMANS FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, LUMBERMANS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, FIRST SOUTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY, formerly MORRISON ASSURANCE COMPANY, UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY,))))))))))))
Defendants.))

DISMISSAL

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Oklahoma Fixture Company, and hereby dismisses the above entitled action. This dismissal is with prejudice in respect of the claims of the Plaintiff against the Defendants for "Environmental Pollution" at the "Site" and this dismissal is without prejudice in respect of all other claims of the Plaintiff against the Defendants contemplated by this cause.

Respectfully submitted,

HOUSTON AND KLEIN, INC.

Bv:

David F. James, OBA #4610 320 South Boston, Suite 700 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103

(918) 583-2131

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF, OKLAHOMA FIXTURE COMPANY

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on this $\underline{\mu}$ day of $\underline{January}$, 1992, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing DISMISSAL was mailed, postage prepaid, to:

Judith Fournie Helms TRESSLER, SODERSTROM, MALONEY & PRIESS 200 W. Adams Street, Suite 3000 Chicago, Illinois 60606

Phil R. Richards
John R. Paul
Gregg L. Graves
RICHARDS, PAUL, RICHARDS & SIEGEL
9 East 4th Street, Suite 400
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103-5118

Robert N. Naifeh, Jr.
Kim Daniel Parrish
DERRYBERRY, QUIGLEY, PARRISH, SOLOMON & BLANKENSHIP
4800 North Lincoln Blvd.
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73105

Joseph F. Glass Leigh Reaves THOMAS, GLASS, ATKINSON, HASKINS, NELLIS & BOUDREAUX 525 South Main, Suite 1500 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103

Randall A. Breshears MONNET, HAYES, BULLIS, THOMPSON & EDWARDS 1719 First National Center West Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102

David F. James

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

GEORGE L. CHASTANG.

Defendant. Civil Action No. 91-C-876-E

NOTICE OF DISMISSAL

COMES NOW the United States of America by Tony M. Graham, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma, Plaintiff herein, through Kathleen Bliss Adams, Assistant United States Attorney, and hereby gives notice of its dismissal, pursuant to Rule 41, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of this action without prejudice. This debt has been paid in full.

Dated this 4 day of February, 1992.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TONY M, GRAHAM United States Atto

ATHLEEN BLISS ADAMS, OBA #13625 Assistant United States Attorney 3600 United States Courthouse Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103 (918) 581-7463

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on the UTH day of February, 1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid thereon, to Mr. George L. Chastang, 2410 W. Pine Place, Tulsa, Oklahoma 74127.

KATHLEEN BLISS ADAMS

Assistant United States Attorney

IN THE UNITED STA	ATES DISTRICT COURT L	D
UNITED INDUSTRIES CORPORATION,) FEB 04 1992	
Plaintiff,	Aicherá II. Levinno, Ch U. S. DISTRICT COUR 110RTHERN DISTRICT OF DRUMON	Ŧ
vs.	Case No. 91-C-978-B	
TIM WATTS and GREGG HILKER,)	
Defendants.)	

CONSENT JUDGMENT AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION

This case came before this Court on a Verified Complaint of Plaintiff United Industries Corporation seeking Injunctive Relief and Damages against Defendants Tim Watts and Gregg Hilker. After the entry by this Court of a Temporary Restraining Order, this Court has been informed that the parties hereto consent to a judgment and permanent injunction (hereinafter "Judgment") as set forth herein. Thus, this Court makes and the parties stipulate to the following findings:

- 1. Plaintiff United Industries Corporation is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri.
- 2. Defendants Tim Watts and Gregg Hilker are citizens of the State of Oklahoma and reside in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
- 3. The amount in controversy in this matter exceeds \$50,000.00 and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332.
- 4. Plaintiff United Industries Corporation operates three unincorporated divisions known as Tulsa Screw Products, DW Products, and Wej-It. These three unincorporated divisions

4

constitute the "Metal Companies." Tulsa Screw Products and DW Products manufacture screw machine products. Wej-it manufactures fasteners and anchor bolts.

- 5. RDS Products, Inc. is a Ft. Worth, Texas company which manufactures screw machine products.
- 6. The parties waive the requirements of further findings of fact or conclusions of law.

This Court, having considered the parties' consent to a judgment and permanent injunction, the pleadings and documents filed in connection with plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order, and arguments of counsel in connection with that order, hereby Adjudges and Decrees, and the parties consent to this Judgment, as follows:

A. Defendants Tim Watts and Gregg Hilker, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and all persons in active concert with them or any of them, are hereby permanently enjoined from (a) purchasing all or any part of RDS Products, Inc.; and (b) disclosing or making use of confidential lawfully protected information concerning the Metal Companies or United Industries Corporation including said companies' methods of pricing, pricing strategy and structure, the identity of higher or lower margin accounts, standard costs, identity of customers, the identity of manufacturing tools used by the Metal Companies and United Industries Corporation, and any internal documents of the Metal Companies and United Industries Corporation.

- B. Defendant Watts is further enjoined from performing any work for or on behalf of RDS Products, Inc., within one year from December 18, 1991, and Defendant Gregg Hilker is permanently enjoined from performing work for or on behalf of RDS Products, Inc. that is in any way violative of his prior Employment Agreement with the Plaintiff United Industries Corporation.
- C. Judgment is entered for Plaintiff United Industries Corporation and jointly and severally against Defendants Tim Watts and Gregg Hilker in the amount of \$5,000.00 actual damages.
- D. The cash bond for a temporary injunction deposited by Plaintiff United Industries Corporation in the amount of \$50,000.00 is to be returned immediately to plaintiff, plus interest, if any, which has accrued thereon.
- E. Costs shall be assessed jointly and severally against Defendants Tim Watts and Gregg Hilker. Plaintiff United Industries Corporation shall not seek as costs its attorneys' fees incurred herein.
- F. The defendants in agreeing to this Judgment acknowledge the jurisdiction of this Court to properly enter and enforce this Judgment. This Judgment shall be enforceable against any and all defendants in this lawsuit, all persons named herein, and any and all other persons, affiliated or acting in concert with those persons.
- G. This Court retains jurisdiction to enforce this Judgment.

H. In the event that any part of this Judgment is violated by any of the named defendants or any other persons, the plaintiff may by Motion with notice to the attorney for the defendants apply for sanctions and such other relief as may be appropriate.

DATED:

United States District Judge

Thomas R. Brett

Agreed as to substance and form

OONE, SMITH, DAVIS, HURST

Paul E. Swain 500 Oneok Plaza

100 West Fifth Street

Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103-4204

(918) 587-0000

COBURN, CROFT & PUTZELL

Agreed as to substance and form

J. William Newbold
One Mercantile Center

Suite 2900

St. Louis, MO 63101

Attorneys for Plaintiff United Industries Corporation Agreed as to substance and form

WHITEBOOK, HOLTZ, GADDIS & POWERS

By

Lloyd K. Holtz 200 Expressway Tower 2431 East 51st Street Tulsa, OK 74105

Attorneys for Defendants Tim Watts and Gregg Hilker

0683w

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE D

JEFF R. HARPER

Plaintiff,

Vs.

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendants.

PEB CA 1982

No. insurance Clerk
NORTHERN DISTRICT COURT

NO.: 91-C-555-B
(No. CJ-91-2931)
District Court of Tulsa
County, Oklahoma

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

It appearing to the Court that the above-entitled action has been fully settled, adjusted, and compromised, and based on stipulation; therefore,

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the above-entitled action be, and it is hereby, dismissed, without cost to either party and with prejudice to the plaintiff.

Dated this 44 day of February 1992.

SI THOMAS H. PRETT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

TAMMY LYNN STARRITT, Personal)
Representative of the)
Estate of William Dan)
Starritt,

FEB -4 1992

AREA COME AMERICE CLEAR U.S. DISHEROF COURT NORTHELL BUSINESS OF CK

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 91-C-006-C

S.P.E., INC. and DORN ENTERPRISES, INC.

Defendants.

JOINT STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL AS TO DEFENDANT ERNST W. DORN CO., INC.

COME NOW the parties and hereby jointly stipulate for dismissal without prejudice of the defendant Ernst W. Dorn Co., Inc. and pursuant to Rule 41, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As evidenced by the signatures of counsel of record hereunder, all parties to the litigation have agreed and stipulated that the defendant Ernst W. Dorn Co., Inc. should be, and is hereby, dismissed without prejudice from this action.

Robert M. Butler James C. Linger BUTLER & LINGER 1710 South Boston Tulsa, OK 74119 (918) 585-2797

Attorneys for the Plaintiff, Tammy Lynn Starritt

Ray Wilburn

Ray Wilburn
David K. Robertson
WILBURN, MASTERSON & SMILING
2526-A East 71st St.
Tulsa, OK 74136-5548
(918) 494-0414

Attorneys for Defendant, S.P.E., Inc.

David C. Johnston, Jr., OBA #4733 D. Craig Johnston, OBA # 11113

PIERCE COUCH HENDRICKSON JOHNSTON & BAYSINGER

P.O. Box 26350

Oklahoma City, OK 73126 (405) 235-1611

Attorneys for Defendant, Ernst W. Dorn Co., Inc.

FILED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OKLAHOMA

FEB 04 1992

Richard M. Lawranco, Clerk
U. S. DISTRICT COURT

HORTHERN DISTRICT COURT

IN RE:	U. S. DISTRICT COURT MORTHERN DISTRICT OF
Wayne Darrell Zang,) Case No. 82-00962-W) Chapter 7
Debtor,)
Ainslie Perrault, Successor Trustee) }
Appellant,))
v.)
Department of Energy,) District Case No. 90-C 712B
Appellee,	<i>)</i>)

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

THIS matter comes on before me upon the Joint Application of the Appellant and the Appellee for dismissal of this Appeal. The Court having reviewed said Application and the file, FINDS:

That the above styled Appeal should be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice all in accordance with Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 8001.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED

SI THOMAS R. BRETT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

J. Scott McWilliams 1612 South Cincinnati Tulsa, OK 74119 (918) 583-8197

ORIGINAL L

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURF I L E D FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA FEB "4 135? \bigcirc

LEAVELL RESOURCES CORP.,)
Plaintiff,	Pichard M. Lawrence, Clerk U. S. DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
vs.) Case No. 91-C-850-E
PAYSAR OIL PROPERTIES, INC., ROBERT GORDON EQUIPMENT, INC., ROBERT GORDON OIL CO., ELDON GORDON, an Individual, DIXIE GORDON, an Individual, ASSOCIATED NATURAL GAS, INC., and LINGAS CO.,))))))))
Defendants.))

DISMISSAL

COMES NOW Defendant, Associated Natural Gas, Inc., and dismisses its claim to recover attorney fees from the funds interpled into the Registry of the Court in the above-styled matter.

R. BRENT BLACKSTOCK, OBA #839
BLACKSTOCK & BLACKSTOCK
5310 E. 31st St., Suite 520
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74135
(918) 622-3661
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
ASSOCIATED NATURAL GAS, INC.

N

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, hereby certify that on this 2 day of February, 1992, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing DISMISSAL was mailed with proper postage fully prepaid thereon to the following:

H. Trattner, Esq.
Charles B. Davis, Esq.
Suite 165, 5555 N.W. Grand Boulevard
Oklahoma City, OK 73112
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

Carol J. Johnson P. O. Box 5493 Denver, CO 80217

Patrick H. Kernan 4500 South Garnett, Suite 900 Tulsa, OK 74146

R. BRENT BLACKSTOCK

WP51\ANGILRC\DISMISS2

DRIGINHL D

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F I L E D FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

LEAVELL RESOURCES CORP.,) FEB ~4 (35) d
Plaintiff,	Richard M. Lawrence, Cleri U. S. DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
vs.) Case No. 91-C-850-E
PAYSAR OIL PROPERTIES, INC., ROBERT GORDON EQUIPMENT, INC., ROBERT GORDON OIL CO., ELDON GORDON, an Individual, DIXIE GORDON, an Individual, ASSOCIATED NATURAL GAS, INC., and LINGAS CO.,)))))))))))))))))))
Defendants.))

DISMISSAL

COME NOW Plaintiff, Leavell Resources Corp., and Defendant, Associated Natural Gas, Inc., and mutually dismiss all of the causes of action and counterclaims included in the within Complaint as to each other except for the claim of Defendant, Associated Natural Gas, Inc., to recover its attorney fees from the funds interpled into the Registry of the Court. Plaintiff will proceed with this action against Defendants, Paysar Oil Properties, Inc., Robert Gordon Equipment, Inc., Robert Gordon Oil Company, Eldon Gordon, an Individual, Dixie Gordon, an Individual, and Lingas Company, Defendants.

5

H. TRATTNER, OBA #9079
CHARLES B. DAVIS, OBA #2189
Suite 165, 5555 N.W. Grand Boulevard
Oklahoma City, OK 73112
(405) 947-6380
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
LEAVELL RESOURCES CORP.

R. BRENT BLACKSTOCK, OBA #839
BLACKSTOCK & BLACKSTOCK
5310 E. 31st St., Suite 520
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74135
(918) 622-3661
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
ASSOCIATED NATURAL GAS, INC.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, hereby certify that on this 31 day of 1992, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing DISMISSAL was mailed with proper postage fully prepaid thereon to the following:

Carol J. Johnson P. O. Box 5493 Denver, CO 80217

Patrick H. Kernan 4500 South Garnett, Suite 900 Tulsa, OK 74146

H. TRATTNER

WP51\ANGILRC\DISMISS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

VS.

JULIA F. YOUNG; GILCREASE HILLS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION; COUNTY TREASURER, Osage County, Oklahoma; and BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Osage County, Oklahoma, FEB 04 1992

FIGURE M. Lawrence, Clerk
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 90-C-0014-B

DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT

This matter comes on for consideration this the day of the figure 1992, upon the Motion of the Plaintiff, United States of America, acting on behalf of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, for leave to enter a Deficiency Judgment. The Plaintiff appears by Tony M. Graham, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma, through Peter Bernhardt, Assistant United States Attorney, and the Defendant, Julia F. Young, appears neither in person nor by counsel.

The Court being fully advised and having examined the court file finds that a copy of Plaintiff's Motion was mailed to Steven W. Vincent, Attorney for Defendant Julia F. Young, 616 South Main, Suite 308, Tulsa, Oklahoma 74119, and all other counsel and parties of record.

The Court further finds that the amount of the Judgment rendered on May 22, 1991, in favor of the Plaintiff United States of America, and against the Defendant, Julia F. Young, with interest and costs to date of sale is \$95,005.71.

The Court further finds that the appraised value of the real property at the time of sale was \$66,000.00.

The Court further finds that the real property involved herein was sold at Marshal's sale, pursuant to the Judgment of this Court entered May 22, 1991, for the sum of \$59,274.00 which is less than the market value.

The Court further finds that the Marshal's sale was confirmed pursuant to the Order of this Court on the 28th day of January, 1992.

The Court further finds that the Plaintiff, United
States of America on behalf of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs,
is accordingly entitled to a deficiency judgment against the
Defendant, Julia F. Young, as follows:

Principal Balance as of 5/22/91	\$73,629.58
Interest	19,795.67
Late Charges to Date of Judgment	309.36
Appraisal by Agency	300.00
Management Broker Fees to Date of Sale	440.00
Abstracting	178.50
Publication Fees of Notice of Sale	127.60
Court Appraisers' Fees	225.00
TOTAL	\$95,005.71
Less Credit of Appraised Value -	66,000.00
DEFICIENCY	\$29,005.71

plus interest on said deficiency judgment at the legal rate of $\frac{1}{2}$ percent per annum from date of deficiency judgment until

paid; said deficiency being the difference between the amount of Judgment rendered herein and the appraised value of the property herein.

United States of America on behalf of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs have and recover from Defendant, Julia F. Young, a deficiency judgment in the amount of \$29,005.71, plus interest at the legal rate of percent per annum on said deficiency judgment from date of judgment until paid.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

TONY/My GRAHAM

United States Atropher

PETER BERNHARDT, OFA #741

Assistant United States Attorney

3600 U.S. Courthouse Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103

(918) 581-7463

PB/css

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the northern district of oklahom I L R.

FEB 3 1992

CAPMAC, INC., an Oklahoma corporation, formerly McKenzie Management, Inc.,

Richard M. Lawrence, Clerk U. S. DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

Plaintiff,

NO. 91-C-345-B

vs.

BURBANK HYDROCARBONS LIMITED, a Nassau corporation, and BEACH PETROLEUM NL,

Defendants.

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff CAPMAC, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation, formerly McKenzie Management, Inc., and Defendant Beach Petroleum NL hereby stipulate and agree to Plaintiff's dismissal of this action only insofar as Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Beach Petroleum NL are concerned, without prejudice for refiling of the same.

Dated this 27^{th} day of Janvary, 1992.

R. MICHAEL CARTER, OBA #1530 SANDRA LEFLER COLE, OBA #13309

5727 South Lewis

Suite 640

Tulsa, OK 74105

(918) 747-7100

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF CAPMAC, INC.

MILGRIM, THOMAJAN & LEE

Βv

LAWRENCE A. WAKS, TBA #20670700
NEAL A. KENNEDY, TBA #11295100
111 Congress Avenue
Twenty-third Floor
Austin, TX 78701
(512) 478-5200

WORKS, LENTZ & POTTORF B. JACK SMITH 1717 South Boulder Suite 200 Tulsa, OK 74119

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT BEACH PETROLEUM NL

FILED

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

FEB 3 1992

SCOTT O'DELL HINDS, an individual,)

Plaintiffs,

Michard M. Lawrence, Clerk U. S. DISTRICT COURT HORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

Case No. 91 C 915 B

v.

PEACHTREE MEDICAL RENTALS, INC.,
a Georgia Corporation; PEACHTREE

PATIENT CENTER, INC., a Georgia
Corporation; PEACHTREE TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a Georgia Corporation; PEACHTREE PATIENT CENTER
CORPORATION, a Georgia Corporation,
INVACARE CORPORATION, an Ohio
Corporation; WHEELCHAIR HOUSE,
LTD., a Colorado Corporation; BILL
TUTTLE, an individual; CRAIG
HOSPITAL, a Colorado Corporation,

Defendants.

DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Scott O'Dell Hinds, and hereby Dismisses Without Prejudice, Defendant, Peachtree Medical Rentals, Inc., a georgia corporation, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rule 41(a)(1), reserving any and all causes of action against all other Defendants included herein.

Sylvia K. Morrow

7000 Central Parkway, Suite 1654

Atlanta, Georgia 30328

(404) 393-0678

Attorney for Defendant

ROBERTS, MARRS & CARSON

C. Clay Roberts, III Clifford N. Ribner

OBA 7632 OBA 7535

110 South Hartford, Suite 111

Tulsa, Oklahoma 74120

(918) 582-6567

Attorneys for Plaintiff

John R. Paul, OBA 6971

Ann C. Hinnant, OBA 13040

Richards, Paul, Richards & Siegel

9 East 4th Street, Suite 400

Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103-5118

Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on the day of the labore and foregoing instrument was mailed with proper postage fully prepaid to:

C. Clay Roberts, III, Esq.
Clifford R. Ribner, Esq.
110 South Hartford, Suite 111
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74120

Sylvia Morrow, Esq. 7000 Central Parkway, Suite 1654 Atlanta, Georgia 30328

John McCormick, Esq. 900 Oneok Plaza Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103

William D. Perrine, Esq.
Rhodes, Hieronymus, Jones, Tucker & Gable
2800 Fourth National Bank
Tulsa, OK 74103

Ann C. Hinnant

ANC:tdr

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

CALVIN F. L. MANN and PATRICIA ANDERSON,

Plaintiff,

vs.

BOB W. HIGHFILL, an individual,)
BOB HIGHFILL d/b/a HIGHFILL)
CORPORATION, and HIGH-FILL)
CORP., an Oklahoma corporation,)

Defendants,

vs.

JAMES T. F. ANDERSON,

Additional-Party Plaintiff,)

and

FARMLAND INDUSTRIES, INC., a Kansas corporation,

Added Defendant.

No. 90-C-913-E

FILED

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Telephord M. Louveness, Clork II. S. DISTRICT COMMIT NORMAL MEMORIA OF CASTRONA

ORDER

This Court, having reviewed the Stipulation of Dismissal filed by the parties, finds that this case should be dismissed with prejudice to the refiling of same. Thus, it is

ORDERED that the First Amended and Supplemented Complaint, Second Amended Counterclaim and all claims for relief are dismissed with prejudice to the refiling of same.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall bear their respective costs, expenses and attorney fees.

IT IS SO ORDERED this ___ day of January, 1992.

ST JAMES O. ELLISON

James O. Ellison UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPROVED:

Craig W. Hoster, OBA #4384
Barbara J. Eden, OBA #014220
BAKER & HOSTER
800 Kennedy Building

Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103 (918) 592-5555

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Calvin F. L. Mann and Patricia Anderson and Additional-Party Plaintiff James Anderson

Joel L. Wonlgemuth, OBA #9811 Thomas M. Ladner, OBA #5161 NORMAN & WOHLGEMUTH 2900 Mid-Continent Tower Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103 (918) 583-7571

Attorneys for Defendants, Bob W. Highfill and High-Fill Corp.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

LEWIS ROSS, JACKY STEALER, LECY HAIR, JEFFREY CHUNESTUDY, and THOMAS FEELING,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

No. 90-C-679-B

FEB 3 1992

TOWN OF SALINA and SALINA PUBLIC WORKS AUTHORITY,

Defendants.

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

All parties stipulate that the above case can be dismissed, with prejudice.

> Nathan H. Young Attorney for Plaintiffs 239 West Keetoowah Tahlequah, Oklahoma

Lewis Ross

Lacy Hair

Thomas Feeling

John H. Lieber ELLER AND DETRICH Attorneys for Defendant 2727 E. 21st Street, Ste. 200 Midway Building 74114

Tulsa, Oklahoma

1111 | 1992

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA U.S. DISTRICT COURT

IN RE:

Beta Energy Corporation,

Debtor,

Ainslie Perrault, Successor Trustee

Appellant,

V.

Department of Energy,

MORTHEM DISTRICT OF CRIAHOMA

Case No. 84-01337-W

Chapter 7

District Case No. 90-C 710 E

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Appellee,

THIS matter comes on before me upon the Joint Application of the Appellant and the Appellee for dismissal of this Appeal. The Court having reviewed said Application and the file, FINDS:

That the above styled Appeal should be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice all in accordance with Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 8001.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED 46 3rd, 1992

be down to to long

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

J. Scott McWilliams 1612 South Cincinnati Tulsa, OK 74119 (918) 583-8197 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT I L E D

LEC CAPITAL CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

FEB 03 1992

Richard M. Lawrence, Clerk

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF DELAHOMA

vs.

No. 89-C-1047-B

CAMPBELL DRILLING COMPANY, INC., BOB E. WALLS, TRUMAN D. HOOVER, BOB L. HAMILTON and BYTHEL CAMPBELL,

Defendants.

J U D G M E N T

In keeping with the Order entered this date sustaining the Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, LEC Capital Corporation, Judgment is hereby entered against the guarantor Defendant, Bob E. Walls, on his Guaranty of February 1, 1985 in the amount of \$236,470.56 in principal, plus interest in the sum of \$177,087.83 to the 3rd day of February, 1992. Interest accrues daily thereafter at the rate of \$136.05 a day computed on the basis of 21% per annum, as provided in the Note. Costs are hereby assessed against the Defendant, Bob E. Walls, as well as a reasonable attorney's fee if timely applied for pursuant to Local Rule 6.

DATED this 3rd day of February, 1992.

THOMAS R. BRETT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

FILED

THEODORE CARR, an individual, THOMAS C. GRINTER, an individual, CLIFFORD HAYES, an individual, and MITCHELL R. KENT, an individual,	Class Action Richard M. Lawrence, Clerk U. S. DISTRICT COURT NOTHERS DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
Intervenor-Plaintiffs,)) Civil Action
CHARLES MCCORKLE, et al.,) No. 86 C 979 E
Plaintiffs,)
vs.	ĺ
THE DOLESE COMPANY, et al.,	,

Defendants.

JUDGMENT

On the 6th day of January, 1992, the above cause came on for trial before the Court and a jury, The Honorable James O. Ellison presiding, the plaintiff class being present by and through its class representatives and its attorneys, the defendant, The Dolese Company, being present by and through its representative and its attorneys, and the issues having been duly tried and the jury having returned its verdict by means of response to Special Interrogatories, as follows (copy of the Special Interrogatories is attached hereto as exhibit "A"):

> Do you find that, during the relevant period, there was devised by anyone, 1. willfully and knowingly, any artifice or scheme to defraud or to obtain money or false or fraudulent by property pretenses?

		\vee
YES	NO	Δ

Such special interrogatory and verdict having been duly signed by the foreperson and dated, was returned to open Court, and accepted by the Court on the 22nd day of January, 1992.

The Court, therefore, enters Judgment on the jury's verdict in favor of the defendant, The Dolese Company, and against the plaintiff class.

IT IS ORDER AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiff take nothing, that the action be dismissed on the merits, and that the defendant, The Dolese Company, recover of the plaintiff class its costs of the action.

The Honorable James O. Ellison U. S. District Judge

Clerk of the Court

Approved as to form:

CHAPEL, RIGGS, ABNEY, NEAL & TURPEN
M. David Riggs, OBA No. 7583
Fred Rahal, Jr., OBA No. 7378
Claire M. Trinidad, OBA No. 11428
502 West Sixth Street
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74119
(918) 587-3161

By Attorneys for the Plaintings

NIEMEYER, NOLAND & ALEXANDER John C. Niemeyer, OBA No. 6683 Linda G. Alexander, OBA No. 195 Three Hundred North Walker Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 (405) 232-2725

and

Edward H. Moler, OBA No. 6298 2800 City Place Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (405) 232-3566 73102

Attorneys for Defendant,

The Dolese Company

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

	DORE A. CARR, an ndividual, THOMAS C.	FILED IN OPEN COURT
CLIF	TER, an individual, FORD HAYES, an individual,	JAN 2 1992
	MITCHELL R. KENT, an vidual,	Michard M. Lawrence, Clark U.S. DISTRICT COURT MUVINSKA DISTRICT OF ONLAHOMA
	Intervenor-Plaintiffs,	
CHAR	LES MCCORKLE, et al.,	
	Plaintiffs,	
vs.		No. 86-C-979-E
THE et a	DOLESE COMPANY,	
	Defendants.	
1.	Do you find that, during devised by anyone, willfu	of the relevant period, there was lly and knowingly, any artifice or otain money or property by false or
		tion number l is "no", you have for the defendant Dolese, and your ate the verdict form.
	If your answer to questi answer the following quest	on number l is "yes", you should ions:
2.	and knowingly devised or	ne relevant period, Dolese willfully r participated in any scheme or obtain money or property by false or
		YESNO
	If your answer to quest completed your verdict in foreperson may sign and da	ion number 2 is "no", you have favor of the defendant, and your ate the verdict form.

	If your answer to question number 2 is "yes", you should answer the following questions:
3.	Were the United States mails used in furtherance of the "scheme to defraud", or for obtaining money under false or fraudulent premises which is referenced in questions numbered 1 or 2 above? The tences
	YESNO
	Were the interstate wires used in furtherance of the "scheme to defraud" or for obtaining money under false or fraudulent pretenses referenced in questions numbered 1 or 2 above?
	YES NO
	If your answer to both of the above questions is "no", you have completed your verdict, and your foreperson may sign and date the verdict form.
	If your answer to either of the above questions is "yes", please answer the following questions:
4.	Did Dolese's conduct in violation of the mail and/or wire fraud statutes constitute a pattern of racketeering activity, as that term has been defined for you in these instructions?
	YES NO
	If your answer to question number 4 is no, please go to question number 8.
	If your answer to question number 4 is yes, please answer the following questions:
5.	Did Dolese derive income from the violation of the mail and/or wire fraud statutes referenced above?
	YES NO
	If your answer to question number 5 is "no", go to question number 8. If your answer to question numbered 5 is "yes", please answer the following question.
6.	Did Dolese invest that income to acquire an interest in, or to establish or operate an enterprise, as that term has been defined in these instructions?
	YES NO
	If your answer to question number 6 is "no", go to question number 8.

If your answer to question number 6 is "yes", please answer the following question: Do you find that the enterprise referred to in question numbered 6 engaged in or its activities affected interstate commerce? YES NO After answering this question, please go to the next question. Do you find that Dolese joined together with any other person 8. or persons to form an "association - in - fact" enterprise, as that term has been defined for you in these instructions? YES NO If your answer to question number 8 is "no", you have completed your verdict, and your foreperson may sign and date the verdict form. If your answer to question number 8 is "yes", please answer the following questions: Did the activities of the association in fact enterprise, 9. referred to in question number 8 affect interstate commerce? YES NO If your answer to question number 9 is "no", you have completed your verdict, and your foreperson may sign and date the verdict form. If your answer to question number 9 is "yes", please answer the following questions: Did Dolese conduct, or participate in the conduct of the 10. affairs of the association in fact enterprise referred to in question numbered 8 through a pattern of racketeering activities, as that term has been defined in these instructions? YES NO ग्रहानिने दिलानः विश्वतिन दिल्ला Horthern District of All derma 1 Thursby could be for the foresten

Richard M. Laurence, Clark

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMAFEB 03 1992

Richard M. Lawrence, Clerk U. S. DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF DELAHOMA

LEC CAPITAL CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

vs.

No. 89-C-1047-B/

CAMPBELL DRILLING COMPANY, INC., BOB E. WALLS, TRUMAN D. HOOVER, BOB L. HAMILTON and BYTHEL CAMPBELL,

Defendants.

ORDER

The Court has for decision the Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 of the Plaintiff, LEC Capital Corporation ("LEC"), against the Defendant, Bob E. Walls ("Walls"). The record reveals the following undisputed material facts:

1. On February 1, 1985, Defendant Bob E. Walls executed and delivered to the Citizens Bank of Drumright, Oklahoma (the "Bank"), a written guaranty of the debts of Campbell Drilling Company, Inc. ("Campbell Drilling"), which by its terms guaranteed payment to the Bank of "all obligations due from said borrower of every kind and character, now due or which may hereafter become due from said borrower to you, however created, arising or evidenced, and also of



The Court previously concluded by its Order of May 29, 1991 that since discovery had not been completed, and an issue of fact remained on the balance due, summary judgment was premature. The record now establishes that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment of January 10, 1992 is at issue and ripe for decision. Defendant, Walls, has advised the Court that he relies on his prior submissions as a response to Plaintiff's renewed Motion for Summary Judgment of January 10, 1992.

any and all renewals or extensions of any of the foregoing." (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1).

- 2. On February 1, 1985, Bythel Campbell, President of Campbell Drilling, executed and delivered to the Bank Promissory Note No. 14696 in the amount of \$300,050.00. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2).
- 3. On October 24, 1985, Defendant Campbell Drilling executed and delivered to the Bank Promissory Note Number 15677 (the "Note") in the original principal amount of Two Hundred Fifty-Seven Thousand Seventy-Three and 82/100 Dollars (\$257,073.82), together with interest payable thereon at the rate of fifteen percent (15%) per annum, with an additional 6% upon default. The Note was signed by Bythel Campbell, President of Campbell Drilling, and states that it is a "renewal" of Note Number 14696. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3).
- 4. On January 6, 1986, March 3, 1986, September 16, 1986, December 30, 1986, and April 21, 1987, the Bank sent letters to Bob E. Walls, demanding payment of the Note. (Attached as Exhibits to Affidavit of D. Mike Moody Plaintiff's Exhibit 4).
- 5. Prior to September 24, 1987, the Bank was a banking corporation organized under the laws of the State of Oklahoma with its principal place of business in Drumright, Oklahoma. At the close of business on September 24, 1987, the Oklahoma State Banking Commissioner assumed exclusive custody and control of the property and affairs of the Bank pursuant to 6 O.S. § 1202(b). (Affidavit of Cheryl Mosier Plaintiff's Exhibit 5).
 - 6. The Oklahoma Banking Commissioner subsequently tendered

to the FDIC appointment as liquidating agent of the Bank pursuant to 6 O.S. § 1205(b). The FDIC as liquidating agent sold certain assets of the Bank to the FDIC in its corporate capacity, including Promissory Note Number 15677 and the Walls Guaranty. (Mosier Affidavit - Plaintiff's Exhibit 5).

- 7. On January 11, 1991, LEC purchased the Note and the Guaranty from the FDIC. (Moody Affidavit Plaintiff's Exhibit 4; Mosier Affidavit Plaintiff's Exhibit 5).
- 8. On April 1, 1991, LEC was substituted as Plaintiff in this action for the FDIC by court order.
- 9. The subject Note is in default and although due demand for payment has been made upon guarantor Walls, he has failed and refused and continues to refuse to pay the debt. (Moody Affidavit Plaintiff's Exhibit 4).
- 10. As of May 25, 1991, the principal amount due on the Note was Two Hundred Thirty-Six Thousand Four Hundred Seventy and 56/100 Dollars (\$236,470.56), together with interest due in the amount of One Hundred and Forty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Thirty and 74/100 Dollars (\$142,530.74), plus interest accruing at the rate of 21% per annum, attorney's fees, and the costs of this action. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and 2; Moody Affidavit Plaintiff's Exhibit 4).

Summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v.

<u>Liberty Lobby, Inc.</u>, 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); <u>Windon Third Oil & Gas v. FDIC</u>, 805 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1986). In <u>Celotex</u>, 477 U.S. at 317 (1986), it is stated:

"The plain language of Rule 56 (c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."

To survive a motion for summary judgment, nonmovant "must establish that there is a genuine issue of material facts..." Nonmovant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita v. Zenith, 475 U.S. 574, 585 (1986).

In defense Walls asserts that the Court is without jurisdiction, that Walls had an oral agreement with the Bank (The Citizens Bank of Drumright, Oklahoma) that his liability on the Guaranty would be limited to 25% of the Campbell Drilling debt, that the purported Promissory Note is not a valid legal obligation of Campbell Drilling Company, Inc., that the Walls Guaranty is not contemporaneous with the debt, and that there was no consideration for Walls' Guaranty.

The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties herein because when the action was commenced by FDIC - Corporate the Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1819, the FDIC having been appointed an agent of the United States for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1345. The purchase of the Note and Guaranty by LEC and its substitution as party plaintiff in this

action does not defeat the Court's jurisdiction. Defendant Walls concurs that the Court had jurisdiction when the FDIC commenced the action. Therefore, the subsequent assignment to and substitution of LEC will not divest the court of jurisdiction. Jones v. Village of Proctorville, Ohio, 303 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1962); Freeport - McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., U.S. ____, 111 S.Ct. 858, 112 L.Ed.2d 951 (1991); J. W. Moore, Federal Practice, \$25.08; Fred Harvey, Inc. v. Mooney, 526 F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1975); Hood v. Bell, 84 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1936); Akzona, Inc. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 662 F.Supp. 603 (D.Del. 1987).

It is well established that when the FDIC acquires a note in its corporate capacity, the obligor of the note cannot defend on the basis of an oral agreement of the type asserted by Walls herein. D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 459-62, 62 S.Ct. 67, 86 L.Ed. 956 (1942), and codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).

12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) provides as follows:

"No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the right, title or interest of the [FDIC] in any asset acquired by it under this section, either as security for a loan or by purchase, shall be valid against the [FDIC] unless such agreement -

- (1) shall be in writing,
- (2) shall have been executed by the bank and the person or persons claiming an adverse interest thereunder, including the obligor, contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by the bank,
- (3) shall have been approved by the board of directors of the bank or its loan committee, which approval shall be

reflected in the minutes of said board or committee, and

(4) shall have been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official record of the bank."

one of the purposes of § 1823(e) is to facilitate the purchase and assumption of failed banks rather than their liquidation. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Newhart, 892 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1989); see also, Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 159 (6th Cir.), cen. denied, 474 U.S. 944, 106 S.Ct. 308, 88 L.Ed.2d 286 (1985), and Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 865 (11th Cir.), cen. denied, 459 U.S. 826, 103 S.Ct. 60, 74 L.Ed.2d 63 (1982). Thus, under the above authority, the guarantor of a note appearing on its face to be a binding and regular obligation is estopped from asserting against the FDIC that the parties orally agreed the guaranty would not be enforced, or from asserting a failure of consideration.

The Court concludes the same protection extends to those who purchase assets from the FDIC in its corporate capacity. When the FDIC obtains the assets of the failed bank by way of purchase and assumption, it acquires the protection of the <u>D'Oench Duhme</u> doctrine and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e). If the FDIC then sells or transfers the asset, the subsequent owner is entitled to the same protection that the FDIC had, under the <u>D'Oench Duhme</u> doctrine, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) and the holder in due course status. <u>Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Newhart</u>, 892 F.2d 47, 49 (8th Cir. 1989); Bell & Murphy and Assoc., Inc. v. Interfirst Bank Gateway, N.A.., 894 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1990); <u>Porras v. Petroplex Savings Ass'n.</u>,

903 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1990). Thus, LEC stands in the shoes of the FDIC - Corporate, from whom it purchased the subject Note and Guaranty, and is entitled to the same protection. LEC is protected from the defenses of a secret oral agreement and a failure of consideration that Walls is asserting.

Walls asserts that such defenses were of record on January 17, 1990, when LEC bought the Note, so LEC was on notice thereof. However, the authorities are clear that in order to facilitate the proper functioning of the FDIC, LEC is permitted to stand in the shoes of the FDIC as a holder in due course.

Walls urges that since he signed the Guaranty of the Campbell Drilling debt on February 1, 1985 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1), and the Promissory Note sued upon was not created until October 24, 1985 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3), there is no liability under his Guaranty.

The undisputed evidence reflects that a contemporaneous Note in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Fifty and No/100 Dollars (\$300,050.00) was executed on February 1, 1985 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2), and the October 24, 1985 Promissory Note was a renewal of the February 1, 1985 Note. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3). The terms of Walls' Guaranty expressly include renewals with the following language:

"The undersigned hereby requests you to give, and continue to give, Campbell Drilling Co., Inc. (hereinafter styled the "borrower"), from time to time as you may see fit, financial accommodations and credit, and, in consideration thereof, whether the same has been heretofore given or may hereafter be given by you to said borrower, the undersigned hereby guarantee and promise and agree to make prompt payment to you, as they severally

mature ... of all loans made, of which may be made, by you to said borrower ... and of any and all obligations, of every kind and character now due or which may thereafter become due from said borrower to you ...

"When any of the Liabilities shall become and remain due and unpaid, the undersigned will, upon demand, pay the amount due thereon."

Walls' reliance on Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 323 is misplaced.

In <u>Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milburn</u>, 615 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1980),
the court stated:

"The record shows an extension of future credit in consideration of a promise of guaranty. It is settled law in Oklahoma that extension of future credit to the principal debtor in reliance upon a guaranty is sufficient consideration for the contract of guaranty concerning both past and future obligations, even though the benefit to the debtor constitutes the whole consideration. [citations omitted]." Id. at 898.

In <u>Penner v. International Harvester Co. of America</u>, 171 Okla.
41, 41 P.2d 843, 844 (1935), the court stated:

"It is not necessary that the benefit of the promisor. to the consideration accrue [citations omitted]. The consideration may be although the entire benefit sufficient, In this case, the accrues to the debtor. extension of future credit to the principal debtor in reliance upon the guaranty, as was shown by the evidence, was sufficient as against the objection that the guaranty was without a valuable consideration . . . "

Walls' Guaranty herein was executed simultaneous with a Promissory Note of Campbell Drilling dated February 1, 1985 (Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2). In Walls' Guaranty he provided for prompt and full payment of future transactions of Campbell

Drilling. The Promissory Note of October 24, 1986 executed for and on behalf of Campbell Drilling Company, Inc. in the amount of \$257,073.82 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3) was a renewal of the previous Note (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) and was just such future credit extension as contemplated in the Guaranty.

Further, Walls asserts that the Promissory Note obligation he guaranteed is not enforceable because it has no corporate seal and no attesting signature of the Campbell Drilling Company, Inc. secretary. Walls does not provide any legal authority setting forth that such items are required to render a corporate Promissory Note enforceable. The Court is aware of no such authority under Oklahoma law. By the terms of the Guaranty Walls agreed to pay all loans made by Campbell Drilling Company, Inc. "however created, arising or evidenced, and also of any and all renewals or extensions . . ." Walls cites the case of Oklahoma City General Hospital v. Weathers, 147 Okla. 25, 294 P. 98 (Okla. 1930), which states ". . . the authority of an officer or an agent of a corporation need not necessarily be expressed but it may be implied from the circumstances. . . "

The record herein reveals that Walls was aware of the note and his Guaranty, and never asserted an objection regarding the authority of Bythel Campbell to sign either Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 or Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 as President of Campbell Drilling Company, Inc. The record reveals that commencing in January 1986 the Bank sent numerous letters to Walls demanding payment of the debt pursuant to his Guaranty. (Attachment to Affidavits of D. Mike

Moody - Plaintiff's Exhibit 4). There is no evidence in the record that Walls, previous to the commencement of this action, ever questioned the authority of Bythel Campbell to borrow the money and sign the Notes on behalf of Campbell Drilling Company, Inc.

Lastly, the record reveals that the current balance on the subject Note (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3) as of February 3, 1992, is \$236,470.56 principal and \$177,087.83 in interest, for a total payoff balance of \$413,558.39 (Exhibits D, E and F to the Affidavit of D. Mike Moody - Plaintiff's Exhibit 4). Interest continues to accrue daily at the Note default rate of 21% per annum (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3).

For the reasons stated above, the Motion for Summary Judgment of the Plaintiff, LEC Capital Corporation, is hereby SUSTAINED and Defendant's objection to the Court's jurisdiction is hereby OVERRULED. A separate Judgment in keeping with this Order shall be filed contemporaneous herewith.

DATED this 3ad day of ______, 1992

THOMAS R. BRETT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE